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The EMSs approach to macroeconomics introduces strategic interactions and en-
dogenous entry decisions in the analysis of aggregate phenomena as business cycle,
international trade and growth. This survey provides a non-technical discussion of
the applications of the EMSs approach to positive and normative issues, and relates
these with recent debates on the current recession, future scenarios for glabalization,
policymaking and the New Economy.
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1The endogenous market structures (EMSs) approach to macroeconomics in-
troduces strategic interactions and endogenous entry decisions in the analysis
of aggregate phenomena. Its recent development took place in the theory of in-
dustrial organization (see Sutton, 1991, 1998, Etro 2006, 2008b), in the theory
of business cycles (see Cooper, 1999; Bilbiie et al., 2007, 2008a,b; Etro and Col-
ciago, 2007), in the theory of international trade and ﬁnance and of trade policy
(Peretto, 2003, Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Sutton, 2007; Etro, 2010) and in the
theory of Schumpeterian growth (Peretto, 1996, 1999; Etro, 2004, 2008a).1
The EMSs approach departs from the perfectly competitive environment, in
the sense that ﬁrms do not take prices as given, but they do choose their entry
and production strategies and they interact strategically. In general equilibrium,
this leads to novel implications for the mechanism of propagation of supply and
demand shocks, for the theory of the gains from trade and for the sources of
the growth process. In this survey, we review the main results of the EMSs
approach in a non-technical manner. For simplicity, we summarize them in
ten principles, half of which have a positive nature, in the sense that they
describe crucial aspects of the way the economy works, and half of which have
a normative nature, in the sense that they provide policy implications. The
discussion is going to be largely informal and try to link theoretical results to
the current economic debates on macroeconomic issues and on relevant market
structures, in particular of the New Economy.
The development of the EMSs approach relies on a general critique of the
neoclassical approach: the main neoclassical assumption, perfect competition,
is not only a bad approximation of realistic market conditions, but also a mis-
leading one if we want to understand the aggregate behavior of the economy and
derive correct policy implications. The ﬁrst point is almost self-evident: large
size of the markets and entry do not lead to market structures in anyway close
to the perfectly competitive ideal. If we think about any major market of the
global economy (automobiles, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, computers,
semiconductors, software, online advertising) we ﬁnd high levels of concentra-
tion and sometimes only a few big players. Strategic interactions, variable mark
ups and entry are crucial aspects of real world markets and they play no role in
the neoclassical paradigm (or in the extensions to monopolistic behavior with
constant mark ups and exogenous entry).
In real world markets, proﬁtability is what attracts entry and investment. In
turn, entry strengthens competition and reduces the mark ups through strate-
gic interactions. The EMSs approach suggests that these factors lead to new
mechanisms of propagation of the shocks over the business cycle, to additional
consequences on the long run performance of the economy, to novel sources of
gains (and losses) from trade associated with the globalization process, to a dif-
ferent role of market leaders in driving technological progress and growth, and
1For wide surveys see Etro (2007,a) on partial equilibrium applications and Etro (2009,a)
on general equilibrium applications.
2to new forms of dynamic ineﬃciencies in the process of business creation.
Our hope is that the introduction of EMSs in the macroeconomic analysis can
also shed new light on a number of policy issues. While our approach conﬁrms
the optimality of a countercyclical ﬁscal policy and a price stabilizing monetary
policy, it provides alternative motivations for these policies. The former should
optimize the process of business creation over the business cycle and requires
a supply-based ﬁscal policy with countercyclical tax rates on sales and labor
income. The latter should avoid the negative eﬀects of nominal frictions on
the process of business creation, and especially on the process of innovation
driving growth. Finally, the EMSs approach provides new predictions for the
optimal trade policy, for the role of exchange rate policy and for R&D policy,
predictions that are often in radical contradiction with the traditional results.
For instance, our approach shows the general optimality of unilateral export
promoting policies as export subsidies, against traditional results which are
typically in favor of export taxes.
In the rest of the paper we discuss these ten principles one by one, and asso-
ciate them with digressions on related applied issues, with a special attention to
the endogenous structure of global markets that are relevant for the macroeco-
nomic analysis. We recommend the reader to focus directly on the digressions
of his or her interest.
1 Short-run EMSs and the Competition Eﬀect
The novelty of the EMSs approach to macroeconomics relies on its analysis of
the structure of markets that populate modern economies. Perfect competition,
which is the standard way to model competition in the neoclassical theory,
requires that ﬁrms can be created at no cost, act as price-takers, in the sense that
they do not perceive themselves as aﬀecting market prices with their choices,
and in equilibrium they sell goods at the marginal cost of production, obtaining
always zero proﬁts. In such a framework, the market structure is indeterminate,
in the sense that we have nothing to say about how many ﬁrms should be in
the market and how much each one should produce in equilibrium. Even the
concept of (stock market) value of a ﬁrm as the discounted sum of its future
proﬁts has no sense, since expected proﬁts are zero.
Contrary to the neoclassical approach, the EMSs approach departs from the
perfectly competitive paradigm, and introduces more realistic forms of compe-
tition between ﬁrms choosing their prices or their production levels and inter-
acting in a strategic way. Moreover, this approach takes in consideration that
ﬁrms decide rationally whether to enter or not in a market according to the
proﬁtability conditions: in particular the technological conditions are general-
ized to include positive ﬁxed costs of entry, so that only a few ﬁrms enter in each
market and only if they foresee enough gross proﬁts to cover the ﬁxed costs. The
combination of these ingredients leads to markets where the strategies of the
3ﬁrms, their number and even their (stock market) value can be endogenously
characterized in the short and long run as functions of the structural parameters
of the economy.
Our approach can also depart from the neoclassical assumption that invest-
ment builds physical capital which is then rented by the ﬁrms and used as a
factor of production together with labor. That was a good starting point to de-
scribe production in the industrialization phase, characterized by the dominance
of the secondary sector based on the accumulation of physical capital (manu-
facturing) and by the social conﬂict between capital and labor. However, that
assumption is not such a good one to describe production in the modern age,
dominated by the tertiary sector (services) and by the New Economy. In this
age creativity, know-how and innovations are the main inputs needed to bring
new products to the market, and a well developed ﬁnancial sector and protected
IPRs allow smart ideas to become business activities and start up companies to
reach easily a high (stock market) value without having built any stock of phys-
ical capital (yet). This is even more evident when we think of growth, a process
driven mostly by capital accumulation during the industrialization phase, but
largely driven by business creation and innovations in high-tech sectors in the
current industrialized world.
On the basis of these considerations, the EMSs approach takes a diﬀerent
route from the neoclassical one in assuming that investment mainly creates new
ﬁrms or new products which complement or replace the old ones. The mecha-
nism of business creation works through a simple channel: the expectation of
future proﬁts induces entrepreneurs to invest in the creation of new products.
However, this mechanism has already in nuce a counterbalancing eﬀect. En-
try of new ﬁrms increases the number of competitors, and these become more
aggressive. They may actually compete in diﬀerent ways, for instance by choos-
ing their prices (Bertrand competition) or the quantity of production (Cournot
competition) or in more complex ways in the presence of leaders, asymmetries,
heterogeneity between ﬁrms and so on. In all these cases, entry strengthens
competition, which reduces the mark ups and the proﬁts that other ﬁrms can
expect from entering in the same market. Ultimately, in equilibrium, each ﬁrm
must choose the proﬁt maximizing strategy given those of the other ﬁrms, and
the number of ﬁrms must be such that there are no other ﬁrms with incentives
to enter.
The characterization of the aggregate equilibrium with EMSs emphasizes a
new mechanism of propagation of the shocks in the short run that can be rele-
vant to explain the business cycle beyond the standard mechanisms emphasized
by the neoclassical approach of Kydland and Prescott (1982). Consider a posi-
tive and temporary shock to the economy. The positive impact on consumption
leads to an increase in proﬁts for the active ﬁrms, which attracts subsequent
entry of new ﬁrms. Entry is only gradual and temporary, but it strengthens
competition between all the ﬁrms, which leads to a gradual and temporary re-
duction of the mark ups and, through a general equilibrium mechanism, to an
4increase of the real wages. The temporary reduction of the mark ups induces
agents to substitute future consumption with current consumption, i.e. to tem-
porarily increase consumption. At the same time, the temporary increase in the
real wage induces agents to increase labor supply. The consumption boom and
the work boom, in turn, have a feedback eﬀect on proﬁt s ,e n t r y ,c o m p e t i t i o n
and mark ups, which magniﬁes the impact of the shock. Of course, this mech-
anism could not take place in situations where mark ups were zero (as in the
perfectly competitive framework) or in situations where mark ups were positive
but constant and entry was independent from the proﬁtability conditions (as in
the New Keynesian literature). We can summarize this novel mechanism with
the following principle:
Principle 1. In the short run, the EMSs link demand & supply
conditions with endogenous entry and mark ups. A positive shock
to the economy attracts entry, strengthens competition reduces
mark ups and increases real wages, which boosts consumption and
labor supply and propagates the shock.
An important consequence of this principle, is that the economy is charac-
terized by procyclical entry of ﬁrms and countercylical mark ups, two patterns
that are well documented in the data and that remain largely unexplained in
the neoclassical theory or in its extensions to monopolistic behavior. The simu-
lation of the simplest possible model calibrated on the U.S. economy has shown
that the EMSs approach allows us to mimic the variability of the main aggre-
gate variables as output, consumption, investment, labor supply and proﬁts at
least as well as a more complex neoclassical model in the Real Business Cycle
tradition, and to do even better at replicating second moments of the U.S. data.
1.1 The boom of the 90s
If the mechanism of propagation of the shocks suggested here represents an
important component of the business cycle, it may allow us to reinterpret the
reaction of economies to shocks, and in particular to clarify what is going on in
the current recession. With this purpose in mind, let us ﬁr s tl o o ka tw h a th a p -
pened during the 90s, when a positive and permanent technology shock hit the
global economy: it was the beginning of the so-called New Economy, founded on
new general purpose technologies associated with PCs and the Internet. When
t h ei m p a c to ft h ed i ﬀusion of these technologies on the global productivity be-
came evident, growth opportunities opened up and proﬁt expectations gradually
improved in many sectors, and not just in the sectors of the New Economy. In
particular, most service sectors, which represent the large majority of business
in the developed world, beneﬁted from the cost-reducing impact of new soft-
ware and hardware, and a heavy process of business creation and innovation
took place in these sectors.
5The expectations on proﬁtability and growth, mirrored by the stock mar-
ket have been positive for such a long period (during the years of the Clinton
Administration) that they drove one of the longest period of sustained growth.
Observers and economists started welcoming a “new era” in which business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations were limited and could be smoothed with the standard tools
of ﬁscal and monetary policy, and the growth rate became the main interest
of policymaking and economic theory. Growth was high not only in the U.S.,
but also in all those countries where the market forces (of business creation)
were working freely. As a matter of fact, U.S. consumption and imports started
driving foreign growth, and U.S. investments (in business creation and innova-
tion) attracted capital from the rest of the world.
The American consumption boom went as far as to reach a rate of savings
out of disposable income close to zero in 2000 and a rate of indebtedness out
of disposable income at 140 %.2 While a similar extreme behavior could be
rationalized on the basis of high growth expectations, it persisted when these
expectations changed at the turn of the century (with the stock market crash
ﬁrst, and then with the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001), and turned
into a pathological incapacity to save, leading to serious imbalances. These can
be summarized in three main critical consequences of the consumption boom: 1)
the excessive imports of foreign goods maintained a large deﬁcit in the foreign
accounts, 2) the excessive borrowing in terms of easy mortgages put upward
pressure on real estate prices (see Fig. 1-2), and 3) the excessive leverage of
equity capital3 in the ﬁnancial sector induced excessive risk taking and drugged
stock market prices (see Fig. 1-2). Some commentators, led by Shiller (2005),
have argued that the dot-com boom (peaking in 2000) and the real estate boom
(peaking in 2006) could be explained only in part by structural factors,4 but
also by cultural and psychological factors associated with a sort of “irrational
exuberance”. Whether a large part of these booms were “bubbles” or not, the
American imbalances could only be corrected with a drastic depreciation of the
Dollar, with the house price crash and with the ﬁnancial crisis.
2Total indebtedness of the U.S. economy surpassed 350 % of GDP in 2006, most of which
owed by the private sector, while public debt was around 60 % of GDP (Di Noia and Micossi,
2009).
3The ratio assets/equity reached an average of 30 for U.S. investment banks (up to 33 for
Morgan Stanley, 32 for Merrill Lynch, 31 fo Lehman Brothers, 22 for Goldman Sachs) and of
33 for large European cross-border banks (up to 53 for Deutsche Bank and 52 for UBS).
4According to Shiller (2005), structural factors leading to the stock market boom included
the cultural and political (ﬁscal) changes favoring business creation, the new information
technologies, a supportive monetary policy, the expansion of deﬁned contribution pension
p l a n si nt h es t o c km a r k e t ,t h eg r o w t ho fm u t u a lf u n d sa n de v e nt h ee x p a n s i o ni nm e d i a
reporting of business news and analysts’ over-optimistic forecasts.
61.2 The current global recession
During 2008, the global economy has entered in its deepest economic recession
since the Great Depression of 1929.5 Multiple factors have caused this crisis,
including the rapid but temporary increase in the oil price during the ﬁrst half of
the year (a negative supply shock similar to those of the 70s, though shorter; see
Fig. 3). However, there is a large consensus that the main source of the global
recession was in the losses emerged from the subprime crisis associated with
the bursting of the U.S. housing boom in 2006, and with the consequent stock
market crash and the depression of consumer conﬁdence (a negative demand
shock similar to that of the Great Depression). What the debate is mainly
about, however, is the mechanism that has propagated and deepened the crisis:
is it revised expectations on future prosperity? or irrational depression? a
collapse of consumer demand due to the wealth losses? a pure credit crunch?
or bad or insuﬃcient policy reactions? Before advancing our hypothesis, let us
establish the facts.
For a decade before the real estate downturn in the U.S., loan incentives
and a long-run trend of rising housing prices encouraged Americans to assume
mortgages with the hope that they could reﬁnance at more favorable terms
later. However, once housing prices started to drop, reﬁnancing became more
diﬃcult, and in front of a fall in prices by 25 % or more (especially in towns like
Boston, Los Angeles or Miami), many borrowers ended up with negative equity,
that is with a mortgage worth more than the house, and became insolvent. The
number of borrowers in default kept increasing with the housing bust (and now
with the crisis of the real economy), but the worst consequences were going to
happen in the ﬁnancial sector.
The so-called “subprime crisis” was exactly due to the high default rates on
subprime and other adjustable rate mortgages made to higher-risk borrowers
with lower income or worse credit history than prime borrowers. The market
for subprime lending reached a ﬁfth of total U.S. mortgage market. The poten-
tial losses in the event of a real estate downturn would have not been such a
big problem if risks were properly taken into account by the mortgage brokers:
this was not the case since they were able to repackage the returns on these
mortgages, bundle them together and sell them in diﬀerent slices to ﬁnancial
institutions, even under high ratings that had no relation with the underlying
reality of the actual subprime mortgages. In a recent book on the role of animal
spirits in driving the economy Akerlof and Shiller (2009) notice that, as long
as housing prices kept increasing this was “an economic equilibrium that econ-
mpassed the whole chain, from the buyers of the properties, to the originators
5The Great Depression started with the stock market crash on October 29, 1929, and was
characterized by a sequence of bank failures, a tight monetary policy, and a long deﬂation,
with U.S. GDP falling from $ 103 bn in 1929 to $ 56 bn in 1933, and unemployment increasing
from 3 % to 25 %. Only with the New Deal of public spending by President Roosevelt, the
recovery started.
7Figure 1: Real S&P 500 Composite Price Index (solid, left scale) and Home
Price Index (dashed). Source: Di Noia and Micossi (2009).
Figure 2: Real S&P 500 Price/Earnings, 10 yrs Moving Average (solid, left
scale) and Home Price/Rent (dashed). Source: Di Noia and Micossi (2009).
8of the mortgages, to the securitizers of the mortgages, to the rating agencies,
and ﬁnally to the purchasers of the mortgage-backed securities. They each had
their own motives. But those at the beginning of the chain - those who took
on the mortgages and the houses they could not aﬀord, and those who were the
ultimate holders of the debt - were buying a modern form of snake oil.”
The wide (and unregulated) diﬀusion of derivatives based on these risky as-
sets spread the related losses throughout the American and international ﬁnan-
cial markets, with eﬀects that were largely ignored by rating agencies and that
emerged in their magnitude only later, gradually and everywhere.6 In February
2008 a highly leveraged British bank, Northern Rock, had to be nationalized
because of its heavy liquidity problems which triggered a bank run. Since then,
a number of American and European ﬁnancial institutions that were widely
engaged in the securitization of mortgages started facing similar problems. In
March 2008, Bear Stearns had to be acquired by JP Morgan Chase with the
assistance of the Fed. In July, one of the largest mortgage lenders in the U.S.,
IndyMac Bank, collapsed. In September 2008, the U.S. Government placed the
huge mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into federal conservator-
ship and bought 80% of the major insurance company AIG. On September 15,
2008, the investment bank Lehman Brothers ﬁled for Chapter 11 (the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history) after the Bush Administration refused to bail it out
(probably to avoid further moral hazard problems). In the meantime, Merrill
Lynch was acquired by Bank of America (and Wachovia by Wells Fargo) and
the two remaining large investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley,
were converted to traditional banks, concluding the era of investment banking,
and maybe also the Anglo-Saxon dominance of the global banking sector.7
In the Fall 2008 the crisis entered an acute phase characterized by a stock
market crash, the failure of prominent banks, eﬀorts by American and Euro-
pean authorities to bailout distressed ﬁnancial institutions, lack of conﬁdence
and further defaults. As Krugman (2008) has noticed, “the result of this self-
reinforcing process was, in eﬀect, a massive bank run that caused the shadow
banking system to shrivel up, much as the conventional banking system did in
the early 1930s. Auction-rate securities, in eﬀect a banking sector providing $
330 billion worth of credit, disappeared. Asset-backed commercial paper, an-
other de facto banking sector, dropped from providing $ 1.2 trillion in credit
to providing only $ 700 billion.” The lack of conﬁdence froze interbank lending
6Already in February 2007 HSBC was the ﬁrst bank to write down its holdings of subprime-
related mortgage backed securities, by $ 10.5 billion. The current estimates suggest that
American ﬁnancial institutions will have to write oﬀ at least $ 1.5 trillion of their holdings of
similar “toxic assets”.
7In 1999 only two American ﬁnancial institutions had a market capitalization above $ 100
billion, Citigroup (with $ 151 bn) and Bank of America (with $ 113 bn), followed by the
British HSBC and the Lloyds. In March 2009, three Chinese banks lead the ranking: the
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China ($ 175 bn), China Construction Bank ($ 129 bn) and
Bank of China (113 $ bn). At the time of writing, the market capitalizations of Citigroup and
B a n ko fA m e r i c aa r er e s p e c t i v e l y$1 4b na n d$4 0b n .
9Figure 3: The 2008 Oil Shock
worldwide and induced a substantial reduction of lending to ﬁrms. Subsequent
announced and implemented nationalizations8 spread additional fear and lack
of conﬁdence in the markets and led to further stock market crashes at the
beginning of 2009.9 Larry Summers, Director of the White House’s National
Economic Council, has calculated that worldwide wealth lost about $ 50 trillion
in the last year and half, more or less two thirds of global GDP.
The Obama Administration is reacting to the crisis with an unprecedented
8Temporary and partial nationalizations of European banks include in chronological order
Roskilde Bank (Denmark), Fortis (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), Glitnir, Lands-
banki and Kaupthing (Iceland), Carnegie (Sweden), Parex Banka (Latvia), Commerzbank
and Hypo (Germany), Anglo Irish Bank (Ireland), RBS and Lloyds (U.K.).
9A clever proposal to reverse this process and revitalize the stock market and investment
came from Ricardo Caballero (How to Lift a Falling Economy, The Washington Post,p .
19). His proposal was that governments should pledge to buy “up to twice the number of
shares currently available, at twice some recent average price, ﬁve years from now. (Obviously
the speciﬁc numbers are only an example). While the policy is about future (and unlikely)
interventions, the immediate impact would be enormous. In particular, it would turn around
the negative stock markets dynamics, and it would allow banks to raise private capital.” As
all smart proposals, it has not received much attention.
10expansionary ﬁscal policy (see Section 6) and with a plan by the Treasury Sec-
retary Tim Geithner to deal with the “toxic assets” that are clogging up bank
balance sheets,10 while the Fed, led by the main academic expert of the Great
Depression, Ben Bernanke, has implemented an equally unprecedented expan-
sionary monetary policy (see Section 7). The rest of the Western world has
followed a similar road adopting deﬁcit spending and reducing drastically the
interest rates. Meanwhile, the ﬁnancial crisis has extended its disruptive impact
from ﬁnancial institutions to countries (in particular small European countries
outside the E.U. or inside it but not in the Euroarea) whose ﬁnancial accounts
and currencies were (and will keep being) under heavy pressure, in particular
Iceland, the Baltic Republics (Latvia in particular), Hungary, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and Ukraine.
The melt down of stock market capitalizations reduced even more the incen-
tives to invest and create new business activities. In the U.S., venture capital
investment, a key source (and indicator) of innovation and business creation
(amounting to 0.22% of American GDP in 2007), went down by a third in the
last quarter of 2008 (compared to the previous year). Other traditional forms of
investments in business creation collapsed as well, possibly limited by a credit
crunch. This weakness of the investment process transmitted the ﬁnancial crisis
to the real economy. First, ﬁrms reduced their production levels, exhausted
their inventories and stopped hiring new workers, then they started to close fac-
tories and ﬁre workers. At the end of 2008, consumer demand in the Western
world started decreasing as well, quickly for durable goods (as it always happens
during recessions), and slowly for the other goods. In the last quarter of the
year most Western countries were oﬃcially in recession. During 2009 we expect
an impressive number of ﬁrms to go out of business: only in Europe two hun-
dred thousand SMEs are expected to go bankrupt in 2009,11 a third more than
usual, and many others will drastically restrict their business or stop exporting.
At the time of writing, the estimates for the growth of gross domestic product
feature - 3 % for the U.S., - 4 % for the Euro area, -5/6 % for Japan, and + 6.5
% for China (everywhere with inﬂation rates very close to zero).
Markets have experienced two main phenomena. On one side investment
has decreased, business creation and R&D spending have been often limited or
10The plan provides mechanisms to price these troubled assets (whose real value is hardly
known), and huge public subsidies (by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Fed) to encourage on one side investors to buy them and on the other side banks to sell them.
There are two problems with the plan. The ﬁrst is an accounting problem: these transactions
force banks to record losses on their portfolios, while they may prefer to carry loans at the
original face value on their balance sheets and set aside only a percentage of the future losses.
The public subsidy is aimed a solving this problem by overpricing the assets (with public
money and risk), but it may not be enough. The second problem is economic: banks may try
to sell only the truly worthless toxic assets, and this adverse selection may lead buyers not to
bid for them. The cooperation of public authorities and banks in the choice of the assets to
sell may solve this problem. Only the success of the Geithner plan may lessen the need for
the U.S. government to recapitalize banks with temporary nationalizations.
11See the article by Guido Tabellini (Le Scelte dei Governi, Sole 24 Ore, February 1, 2009).
11postponed, many multi-brand ﬁrms have reduced the number of brands supplied
on the market, other ﬁrms simply stopped exporting to selected countries, some
others have merged or are trying to merge with direct competitors,12 and other
ﬁrms have gone bankrupt. The consequent drop in net ﬁrms entry has led to a
reduction in the number of ﬁrms or products within many sectors. On the other
side, surviving ﬁrms have undergone a process of rationalization and job cuts.
This process has been quite spectacular in certain global and highly concentrated
sectors, starting with the automotive and electronic markets, where most of the
leading manufacturers announced job cuts almost at the same time.13 But of
course, it is in smaller and local markets that business destruction leads to
substantial reductions in the number of active ﬁrms. Likewise, many suppliers
of large companies (for instance in the automotive and electronic markets) and
downstream ﬁrms go bankrupt as a consequence of the problems of the leading
companies. This is going to increase the levels of concentration in many markets,
allowing the remaining ﬁrms to exploit the only ways to cover the ﬁxed costs
of production in the presence of a smaller aggregate demand: ﬁrst, by reducing
the remuneration of labor and real wages when it is feasible, or by reducing
employment otherwise, and, second, by gradually increasing their mark ups.
The recession is generating a reduction of labor income and proﬁts, but
a relative increase of mark ups, and this has a crucial consequence: a fur-
ther reduction in aggregate consumption (and total employment), generating
an additional depression of the aggregate demand and a collapse of trade across
countries. Surviving ﬁrms are reducing production and cutting jobs, contribut-
ing to the raise of unemployment. This is the competition eﬀect of the EMSs
approach in action, though of course it is working in reverse: in a recessionary
context net business destruction deteriorates the division of surplus between
input remuneration and mark ups and contributes to depress demand. In turn,
this reduction in demand is going to exert a negative feedback eﬀect on proﬁts
and stock market evaluations with an additional negative impact on business
creation, competition and trade, so as to propagate the recession over time and
space.
12Beyond the banking sector, think of the pharmaceutical market, with the huge deals
between Roche and Genentech, between Pﬁzer and Wyeth and between Merck and Schering-
Plough.
13The CEO of FIAT, Sergio Marchionne envisions a global automotive market with only six
major players, each one able to produce 5-6 million vehicles (one from U.S., Japan, Germany
and China, plus a European-Japanese one and another European-American car maker). At
the time of writing, General Motors is at the border of bankruptcy and could only survive
thanks to government aid (and reducing the number of brands and selling Opel), Chrysler
c o u l ds u r v i v eo n l yi fb o u g h tb yF I A Ta n dF o r di sb a r e l yi nab e t t e rp o s i t i o n ,T o y o t ai ss u ﬀering
heavy losses, and all the European producers are asking for strategic state aids (already arrived
for Peugeot and Renault).
122 Steady-state EMSs and Entry
Even if the number of goods and ﬁrms, the mark ups and all the aggregate vari-
ables as output, consumption, investment, labor force and proﬁts are changing
over the business cycle, in the long run their pattern must be determined by the
structural parameters of the economy.
In the neoclassical approach (Solow, 1956), the wealth and growth of nations
depend on the productivity of the workers (and their machines) and on the
evolution of this productivity, on their propensity to work which determines the
size of the labor force in the economy, and on their propensity to save which
determines the sizes of investment and ul t i m a t e l yt h es t o c ko fp h y s i c a lc a p i t a l
of the economy. Of course, there is not a unique path toward economic progress.
Some countries have based their prosperity on the achievement of high levels of
productivity, others have obtained prosperity by working more and others have
reached the same prosperity through high savings rates (because their citizens
were patient and available to give up to current consumption for the well being
of the following generations). Moreover, as suggested by Acemoglu (2009), there
are other factors that aﬀect the long run performance of economies, including
luck, geography, culture, and formal and informal institutions.14
Taking as given the long run impact of these fundamental factors on the pro-
duction possibilities, we claim that there is a second order impact that these and
a few other technological and behavioral factors exert on the market structures
and consequently on the long run performance of the economies. The EMSs ap-
proach has characterized the average structure of productive markets in steady
state (number of ﬁrms, individual production and mark ups) depending on a few
structural parameters and on the form of competition.15 The EMSs approach
has emphasized ﬁve main determinants of the long run market structures and
of the other aggregate variables.
The ﬁrst determinant is given by scale factors as the level of productivity
(or the size of the population): higher productivity (or larger population) leads
to a larger size of the demand inducing more business creation, which in turn
increases the steady state number of ﬁrms and enhances competition while re-
ducing the mark ups. We have noticed that the relation between the size of the
markets and the number of ﬁrms should be less than proportional, reﬂecting the
strengthening of competition associated with more competitors: this hypothesis
is strongly supported by preliminary empirical evidence.16
14See the Intertic Lecture by Dixit (2008) for a wide discussion of this topic.
15F o rag i v e nn u m b e ro fﬁrms, competition tends to be stronger when the ﬁrms choose their
prices against each other rather than when they choose their production levels. Nevertheless,
stronger competition reduces the expected proﬁtability and therefore attracts a lower number
of ﬁrms, that in turn works toward less intense competition between the active ﬁrms. Which
one of the two eﬀects dominates in the long run is not obvious, but our investigation shows
that, ceteris paribus, competition in prices leads to steady states with fewer ﬁrms and lower
mark ups.
16See Czarnitzki and Etro (2009).
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to entry: when these are high, the proﬁtability of entry is low and the long
run equilibrium is characterized by high concentration and high mark ups. Of
course, markets characterized by high sunk costs of entry due to technological
conditions naturally lead to equilibria with few active ﬁr m s ,a n dt h i sd o e sn o t
represent a problem in itself. However, the introduction of a general purpose
technology which reduces the ﬁxed costs of entry is going to positively aﬀect
business creation and therefore competition and output production. Finally,
to the extent that the entry barriers are artiﬁcial, in the sense that they are
due to product market regulations, we can conclude that reforms leading to
deregulation reduce concentration and mark ups in the long run, with a positive
impact on the performance of the economy as a whole.
The third structural factor determining the nature of the EMSs in the long
run is a behavioral factor, the way people discount the future. This degree of
patience is what determines the propensity to save of the households, which
in turn aﬀects the equilibrium in the credit market. When agents are more
patient, their large supply of savings reduces the interest rate, which means
that the discounted sum of future proﬁts is higher: this attracts more entry,
strengthens competition and ultimately reduces the mark ups. Therefore more
patient agents lead to a higher number of ﬁrms in the steady state.
The fourth element is the rate of business destruction due to exogenous
reasons: when the risk of bankruptcy is high, the expected value of business
creation is lower and business creation is limited. Therefore, in case of a high
rate of default there are only few ﬁrms in the long run (but with a high rate of
turnover), and they apply a high mark up to their goods.
The ﬁfth determinant of the long run equilibrium emphasized in our frame-
work is the degree of substitutability between goods. Higher homogeneity of
the goods induces stronger competition between the ﬁr m sa n dl e a d st ol o w e r
mark ups, which in turn attracts a limited number of ﬁrms in the markets. On
the contrary, when goods are highly diﬀerentiated, competition is relaxed and
mark ups are higher, but this attracts more ﬁrms. Of course, markets with dif-
ferent levels of substitutability between goods coexist in the real world, and we
should think of these relations only as general tendencies characterizing diﬀerent
markets.17
Summarizing the results obtained until now with a focus on the impact on
t h em a r ku p s ,w eh a v e :
Principle 2. In the long run, the steady state EMSs are charac-
terized by mark ups increasing in the cost of entry and in the rate
of business destruction and decreasing in labor productivity, in
the discount factor and in the degree of substitutability between
17A last structural parameter that can aﬀect the steady state is the elasticity of labor supply.
When this is larger, agents tend to work more, which tends to allow entry of a larger number
of ﬁrms and to strengthen competition.
14goods.
Notice that the steady state structure of the markets determines not only
what is produced and at which price it is sold, but also how much of it is
consumed, which is what matters for our understanding of the behavior of the
economy and for its reaction to structural changes. The impact of the main
structural parameters on long run consumption under competition in prices in
the markets is the following: higher productivity, more substitutability between
the goods and more patience ultimately lead to larger consumption bundles,
while higher costs of entry and higher rates of business destruction lead to
smaller consumption bundles in the long run.18
The following two case studies discuss the role of business creation over the
business cycle (in the U.S. manufacturing sector), and in reaction to a technology
shock (the introduction of a general purpose technology as cloud computing).
The aim is to exemplify how EMSs can play a crucial role for macroeconomic
analysis.
2.1 Entry and business creation in the U.S.
Our ﬁrst two principles of the EMSs approach have characterized the role of
entry of ﬁrms in the short and long run. Since the phenomena of entry, business
creation and business destruction have been largely neglected by the neoclassi-
cal approach and by the related empirical research at the macroeconomic level,
it is important to collect new evidence on their nature. In a recent fundamental
work, Broda and Weinstein (2009) provide the ﬁrst large-scale examination of
product creation and destruction, documenting the nature, extent and cyclical-
ity of product entry and exit in the U.S. manufacturing sector (and evaluating
the elasticity of substitution within and between sectors). They use a unique
dataset that contains the universe of products with barcodes in sectors that
cover around 40 % of all expenditures on goods in the U.S. Consumer Price
Index (therefore they do not refer to general business creation, which includes
any kind of business or service, but to genuine product creation or innovation).
F i g .4t o6r e p r o d u c et h e i rm a i nr e s u l t s .T h eﬁr s to n er e v e a l st h a ta l m o s t8 0
% of the products that existed in 2003 did not exist in 1994, and they comprised
64 % of expenditures in 2003. The value of the products that disappeared in
the same period was much smaller, about 37 % of expenditure in 1994. This
suggests that new products, mostly produced by previously existing ﬁrms from
the same or another sector (innovation by leaders), and sometimes produced
18Things are not that simple under diﬀerent modes of competition because these may lead to
persistent ineﬃciencies on which we will return below. Notice also that we are loosely referring
to the consumption bundle of the agents, which is enhanced by the number of varieties available
(to appreciate the diﬀerence, notice that more patience leads to richer consumption bundles
because higher savings allow the economy to produce more goods, but the agents consume
less of each good).
15Figure 4: Business creation. Source: Broda and Weinstein (2009)
16Figure 5: Business creation by sectors. Source: Broda and Weinstein (2009)
by fully new entrants, systematically displaced market share from the available
products. This is an important indication that new products are of a higher
quality and contain a component of innovation. Broda and Weinstein (2009)
show that, in a typical year, 40 % of household’s expenditures are in goods that
were created in the previous four years, and 20 % of expenditures are in goods
that will disappear in the following four years.
Moreover, market turnover is higher in innovative sectors. Fig. 5 reports
the ranks of the top and bottom ten sectors (between a hundred main sectors)
in terms of turnover, where Broda and Weinstein (2009) deﬁne turnover as the
sum of creation and destruction in the sector. Pre-recorded videos, cameras,
and computer software are characterized by high entry/exit process and this is
not surprising given the high degree of technological innovations in these sectors.
More important for our purposes is the analysis by Broda and Weinstein
(2009) on the cyclical behavior of entry. Their Fig. 6 shows that net business
creation is strongly procyclical, with more products being introduced in expan-
sions and in product categories that are booming: an additional 1 % growth
in consumption of a particular sector is associated with 0.3 % increase in the
share of new goods. Gross business creation is strongly procyclical and covaries
more with demand in booms than contractions, while the opposite is true for
business destruction, which is countercyclical, but responds more strongly in
17recessions than in booms. However, most of the procyclicality of net business
creation comes from the procyclicality of creation.
Other recent studies have analyzed empirically the cyclical nature of the tim-
ing of new product introductions in U.S. manufacturing,19 ﬁnding that business
creation varies more in nonseasonal frequencies than in seasonal frequencies, and
responds more to ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand than in market demand, and
in business cycles than in seasonal cycles. All these results support the thesis
that entry is an important procyclical phenomenon that brings new and better
products in the market and that can have a crucial impact on the behavior of
the aggregate economy.
The American economy is a friendly environment to business creation as few
other economies around the world. In the last decade an average of 550,000 new
small businesses were created in the U.S. every month. Since the beginning of
the current crisis this number has been in free fall, and without doubts this is
having a strong impact on market structures and on the aggregate production.
2.2 Cloud computing: the impact of a General Purpose
Technology
The introduction of a general purpose technology (GPT) can provide a fun-
damental contribution to promote growth, competition and business creation.
This was the case of the Internet in the 90s, but a new interesting example is
now given by the introduction of “cloud computing”,20 an Internet-based tech-
nology through which information is stored in servers and provided as a service
(Software as a Service) and on-demand to clients (from the “clouds” indeed).
Its impact will be spectacular on both consumers and ﬁrms. On one side, con-
sumers will be able to access all of their documents and data from any device
(the personal laptop, the mobile phone, an Internet Point..), as they already do
for email services. On the other side, ﬁrms will be able to rent computing power
(both hardware and software) and storage from a service provider, and to pay
on demand, as they already do for other inputs as energy and electricity. The
former application will aﬀect our lifestyles, but the latter will have a profound
impact on the cost structure of all the industries using hardware and software,
and therefore it will have an indirect but crucial impact on business creation
and on the macroeconomy.
The EMSs approach provides the tools to evaluate the economic impact of
the introduction of cloud computing. Before showing this, however, we need
to describe further the nature of this new GPT. Many hardware and software
companies are currently investing to create new platforms able to attract cus-
tomers “on the clouds”. These “cloud platforms” provide services to create
applications in competition or in alternative to “on-premises platforms”, the
19See Axarloglou (2003)
20This section is based on Etro (2009,a).
18Figure 6: Sales growth and net creation (Q4/Q4growth rates). Source: Broda
and Weinstein (2009)
traditional platforms based on an operating system as a foundation, on a group
of infrastructure services and on a set of packaged and custom applications. The
crucial diﬀerence between the two platforms is that, while on-premises platforms
are designed to support consumer-scale or enterprise-scale applications, cloud
platforms can potentially support multiple users at a wider scale, namely at the
Internet scale.
Currently we are only in a phase of preparation with a few pioneers oﬀering
services that can be regarded as belonging to cloud computing. A recent study
of the International Data Corporation has examined the role of IT cloud ser-
vices across ﬁve major product segments representing almost two-thirds of total
enterprise IT spending (excluding PCs): business applications, infrastructure
software, application development & deployment software, servers and storage.
Out of the $ 383 billion that ﬁrms have spent in 2008 worldwide for these IT
services only $ 16.2 billion (4%) could be classiﬁed as cloud services. In 2012
the total ﬁgure was expected to be at $ 494 billion and the cloud part at $ 42
billion, which would correspond to 9% of customer spending, but also to a large
part of the growth in IT spending. The majority of cloud spending is and will
remain allocated to business applications, with a relative increase of investment
in data storage.
Many large high-tech companies are building huge data centres loaded with
hundreds of thousands servers to be made available for customer needs in the
near future. The ﬁrst mover in the ﬁeld has been Amazon, that provides access
to half a million developers by way of Amazon Web Services. Through this
cloud computing service, any small ﬁrm can start a web-based business on its
computer system, add extra virtual machines when needed and shut them down
19when there is no demand: for this reason the utility is called Elastic Cloud
Computing.21
Google is also investing huge funds in data centres. Already nowadays
Google Apps provides word processing and spreadsheet applications online,
while the software and data are stored on the servers. Even the search en-
gine of Google or its mapping service can oﬀer cloud application services. For
instance, when Google Maps was launched, programmers easily found out how
to use their maps with other information to provide new services.
Other software and hardware companies have been actively investing in cloud
computing.22 Social networks have moved in the same direction turning into
social platforms for consumer based applications, with Facebook in the front
road (with its 200 million or more subscribers and an impressive amount of
information available). Yahoo! is developing server farms as well. Oracle has
introduced a cloud based version of its database program. Microsoft has started
later but with huge investments in the creation of new data centres. In the fall
of 2008, the leading software company has introduced a cloud platform called
Windows Azure, currently available only in a preview version. Azure is able
to provide a number of new technologies: a Windows-based environment in
the cloud to store data and to run applications, an infrastructure for both on-
premises and cloud applications, a cloud based database, and an application
tool which allows to synchronize and constantly update data across systems
joined into a “mesh”. Moreover, Windows Azure provides a browser-accessible
portal for customers: these can create a hosting account to run applications or
a storage account to store data in the cloud, and they can be charged through
subscriptions, per-use fees or other methods.23
The battle for the clouds between these companies is going to reshape the
ICT market structure as PC distribution did in the 80s. But according to the
Economist24 “cloud computing is unlikely to bring about quite such a dramatic
shift. In essence, what it does is take the idea of distributed computing a step
farther. Still, it will add a couple of layers to the IT stack. One is made up of
the cloud providers, such as Amazon and Google. The other is software that
helps ﬁrms to turn their IT infrastructure into their own cloud, known as a
21For instance, Animoto, an application that produces videos from user-selected photos
and music, has been a successfull business of this kind. When Animoto was launched on the
leading social network Facebook, it was forced by exponentially increasing demand to bring
the number of machines used on the Amazon Web Services from 50 to 3500 within three days,
something that would have been impossible without relying on a cloud platform.
22Notice that cloud computing implies outsorcing of both software and hardware, therefore
it should not be surprising that hardware producers like Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco and
IBM are investing in the ﬁeld as well. Even producers of consoles for videogames may switch
to games in the clouds in the near future.
23While many applications and services can perform well either on-premises or in the cloud,
Microsoft is working on a wider range of combinations, which enables developers and customers
to manage applications and data in the clouds, or on-premises, or via some combination of
both (Software plus Services).
242008, Economist, “Where the Cloud Meets the Ground”, October 25th, p. 387.
20‘virtual operating system for data centres’ ... Will this prospective platform
war produce a dominant company in the mould of IBM or Microsoft that is
able to extract more than its fair share of the proﬁts? Probably not, because it
will be relatively easy to switch between vendors... Nor is it likely that one ﬁrm
will manage to build a global cloud monopoly. Although there are important
economies of scale in building a network of data centres, the computing needs
of companies and consumers vary too widely for one size to ﬁt all.” Moreover,
the need of creating network eﬀects in the development of a cloud platform will
keep low the margins for a while and will maximize the speed of diﬀusion of
cloud computing between ﬁrms at the global level.
In front of this rapid evolution, it is crucial to understand the economic im-
pact of the introduction of this GPT. Its main economic beneﬁti sa s s o c i a t e d
with a generalized reduction of the ﬁxed costs of entry and production, in terms
of shifting ﬁxed capital expenditure in ICT into operative costs that depend on
the size of demand. This contributes to reduce the barriers to entry especially
for SMEs and intensiﬁes the business creation process. The consequences on
the endogenous structure of markets with large needs of hardware and software
is going to be substantial, with entry of new ﬁrms, strengthening of compe-
tition, reduction of the mark ups, and with an increase in average and total
production.25
Etro (2009,b) employed an adapted version of the model of Colciago and
Etro (2008) with accumulation of ICT capital (hardware and software) and
ﬁxed costs of entry in terms of the ﬁnal good, to estimate the impact of a
gradual diﬀusion of cloud computing. This is translated into a slow reduction
of the ﬁxed cost of entry, which endogenously generates further investments
in business creation. The calculations based on a model calibrated on E.U.
countries show a signiﬁcative impact. Starting from conservative assumptions
on the gradual reduction of the ﬁxed entry costs due to the adoption of cloud
computing, the exercise suggests that the diﬀusion of this innovation may induce
the creation of 100-400 thousand new SMEs in the whole Euroarea, adding a few
decimal points to the growth rate and about a million new jobs in the medium
run.
Part of the positive eﬀects of cloud computing are going to be positively
25Another important beneﬁt is associated with the creation of multidimensional network
eﬀects due to the new possibilities of product creation in the clouds, that is between com-
panies exploiting in diﬀerent ways the potentialities of cloud computing through the same
platform or diﬀerent ones. This is related to another new possibility, the rapid adoption of
changes: it is not uncommon, that applications in the clouds are modiﬁed on a daily base (to
accommodate new requirements, or enable new economic venues), which is impossible with
on-premise solutions. It is important to notice that the aggregate role of these network eﬀects
can be relevant but it is extremely diﬃcult to measure. Finally, cloud computing is going
to introduce the possibility of a) sharing resources (and costs) among a large pool of users,
b) allowing for centralization of infrastructures in areas with lower costs, and c) allowing for
peak-load capacity increases (generating eﬃciency improvements for systems that are often
only 10-20% utilised). These features will lead to additional savings in energy and to greater
environmental sustainability, whose measure, however, is again subject to large uncertainty.
21related to the speed of adoption of the new technology. For this reason, our
investigation suggests that policymakers should promote as much as possible
a rapid adoption of cloud computing. Concrete possibilities include ﬁscal in-
centives and a speciﬁc promotion of cloud computing in particular dynamic
sectors. For instance, governments could ﬁnance, up to a limit, the variable
costs of computing for all the (domestic and foreign) ﬁrms that decide to adopt
a cloud computing solution. Moreover, they could introduce business-friendly
rules for the treatment and movement of data between their country and foreign
countries. These policies may be studied in such a way to optimize the process
of adoption of the new technology and to strengthen the propagation of its bene-
ﬁts within the country.26 International policy competition for the subsidization
of cloud computing solutions would generate positive spillovers across countries,
and some coordination at the E.U. level would be welcome.
As the Economist (ibidem) claims, “[I]nternet disrupted the music business;
Google disrupted the media; cloud-based companies could become disrupters
in other ineﬃcient industries.” One of the few positive aspects of recessions
is that the market selects eﬃcient and innovative ﬁrms able to invest in new
technologies to be exploited in better periods. This may turn out to be at the
basis of the recovery from the current recession.
3 Gains from Trade and the Eﬀects of Global-
ization
Globalization, deﬁned as the increase in trade in goods and factors of production
and associated with the reduction of natural and artiﬁcial trade barriers, is one
of the main phenomena of the last decades, with implications and motivations
that go far beyond economic factors. Understanding the impact of increasing
(and decreasing) openness is one of the major aims of macroeconomic theory.
It is often claimed that globalization leads to lower prices for the consumers
but also to business destruction at the local level. However, the new trade the-
ory summarized by Helpman and Krugman (1985) has emphasized that opening
up to trade leads mainly to other forms of gains and other forms of impact on
business: it keeps prices at the same level and it does not aﬀect the number of
active ﬁrms, while it increases the total number of goods available for consump-
tion at the local level. This generates what are usually called the “gains from
variety” due to openness.
26Moreover, in a context as the European one, smaller countries would be able to obtain
larger gains from similar policies at least in the initial phase, because they would easily attract
foreign investments from larger countries. In a period of increasing limits to other forms of
ﬁscal competition, a policy of subsidization of cloud computing (without discrimination across
ﬁrms of diﬀerent member countries) could generate substantial capital ﬂows toward countries
with good general infrastructures. For instance, early adoption of these policies by small E.U.
countries as Luxembourg or Malta could attract large investments and create wide eﬀects in
terms of output growth and job creation in these countries.
22The EMSs approach emphasizes a related but more complex mechanism.
When a country opens up to trade, say with a bordering country, the domestic
ﬁrms start competing with the foreign ones for both the domestic and the foreign
market (that become an integrated market in the absence of trade frictions).
This strengthening of competition leads to a reduction of the mark ups and
therefore of the prices of all the goods. Proﬁtability and entry are aﬀected in
three ways: ﬁrst, each ﬁrm serves two markets rather than one, which enhances
proﬁtability; second, each ﬁrm is sharing each market with a larger number of
ﬁrms, which reduces proﬁtability; third, stronger competition reduces mark ups
and proﬁtability. The net eﬀect determines the impact on the number of ﬁrms
active in each market. In the absence of asymmetries between the ﬁrms, the
ﬁrst two eﬀects balance each other and the overall impact of opening up to trade
is a reduction of the total number of ﬁrms, which implies business destruction
at the local level. Of course, the number of ﬁrms active in the integrated mar-
ket increases, but less than proportionally. The associated competition eﬀect
generates price reductions and what we called the “gains from competition”.
The extent of this mechanism crucially depends on the type of traded goods.
At one extreme we have perfectly diﬀerentiated goods with competition in prices:
for these goods, all the gains from opening up to trade derive from an increase
in the number of consumed varieties and not from price changes, while business
destruction is absent. This is the typical situation that Krugman had in mind
when talking about the gains from intra-industry trade: globalization makes
diﬀerent brands of cars available for all consumers, which enlarges their options.
At the other extreme, however, we have homogenous goods with competi-
tion in quantities: for these goods, all the gains from trade derive from lower
prices, but business destruction is heavy.27 This is probably what happened in
most markets during the phase of intense globalization of the last years, and it
is not surprising that many supporters of the globalization process have con-
stantly emphasized the price-reducing impact of openness while associating the
business destruction eﬀect with a healthy reallocation of labor across ﬁrms and
sectors. Nevertheless, when the labor market works imperfectly, the social costs
associated with this process of job reallocation can be quite relevant. Summing
up the main insights, we have:
Principle 3. Globalization brings gains from trade by strength-
ening competition, reducing mark ups and prices, and increasing the
number of available goods, but it induces business destruction at
the local level.
Finally, globalization strengthens the interdependence between economies,
and leads to faster propagation of the shocks across countries. In a global
world, we can re-examine the impact of shocks and their international propa-
gation through the EMSs approach. Imagine that the domestic economy is hit
27Of course, in intermediate situations the gains from trade derive from both lower prices
and more varieties, and business destruction is partial.
23by a temporary positive productivity shock. Such a shock increases domestic
consumption and proﬁts, which attracts entry of new ﬁrms in the domestic econ-
omy and strengthens competition. Domestic entry increases labor demand at
home compared to abroad, and exerts upward pressure on the domestic wages,
which causes the relative price of non-traded goods at home to increase relative
to foreign. As a consequence, the increase in domestic productivity generates a
real exchange rate appreciation due to higher prices of domestic non-tradables
and imports and to a larger demand for domestic goods, which leads to persis-
tent deviations from the purchasing power parity (in line with the evidence).
Meanwhile, the positive impact on the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrms and the tem-
porary price reductions do exert an indirect expansionary eﬀect abroad, which
contributes to propagate the boom across countries. The opposite mechanism
w o r k si nc a s eo fan e g a t i v es h o c k ,a n dt h er a p i dd i ﬀusion of the 2008 crisis from
the U.S. to the rest of the world has been one of the most dramatic examples
of the deep interdependence of the modern economies.
Looking at these phenomena in a global perspective, it emerges quite clearly
that macroeconomic policy at the national level is always less eﬀective when it
is not coordinated at a supra-national level, but also that there are large gains
from coordinating policies within international unions or global agreements. The
recent ﬁnancial crisis has urged the coordination and the tightening of ﬁnancial
regulation at a global level to reduce the systemic risks associated with the
tendency of unregulated ﬁnancial intermediaries to overleverage their capital
and to undertake excessive risk). Since only few countries would give away their
sovereignty on this matter, it is at least important that most countries could
agree on a number of basic principles (maybe through the Financial Stability
Forum currently directed by Mario Draghi) and allow stricter regulation on a
unilateral or bilateral basis. More or less as the W.T.O. has done to coordinate
t h ep r o c e s so ft a r i ﬀ reductions toward free trade.28 The future of globalization is
deeply related with the willingness and the ability of developed and developing
countries to coordinate properly their policies.
3.1 Globalization, income distribution and inequality
Our investigation of the impact of openness has emphasized a competition eﬀect,
for which globalization strengthens competition and reduces the prices, and a
business destruction eﬀect, for which an endogenous increase in the equilibrium
size of international ﬁrms leads to the foreclosure of smaller local business.
In the absence of labor market imperfections, this business destruction eﬀect is
inconsequential for the workers: they switch jobs reallocating their work between
as m a l l e rn u m b e ro fl a r g e rﬁrms that have a larger share of the global markets.
28More generally, Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005) have shown that such a two-level
system is politically viable and can improve the outcome of international coordination. For
a similar proposal on ﬁnancial regulation see Dani Rodrik (2009, Economist,“ AP l a nBf o r
Global Finance”, Economic Focus, March 14th, p. 72).
24Nevertheless, job destruction due to globalization can have dramatic eﬀects
in the presence of labor market rigidities, both in terms of unemployment and
income inequalities. When labor market frictions are relevant, some of the work-
ers hit by globalization may ﬁnd it hard to switch to diﬀerent jobs in diﬀerent
sectors and when social insurance and unemployment beneﬁts are limited they
would bear substantial losses while looking for a new job. Meanwhile, the econ-
omy may suﬀer heavily because of the reduction and misallocation of the labor
force.
Our distinction between diﬀerent cases above can help us to understand
better the consequences of globalization. One could think of sectors producing
highly diﬀerentiated goods with competition in prices as sectors where innova-
tion and design are the fruit of skilled labor (characterized by higher human
capital): in these sectors business destruction due to globalization is limited.
On the other side, sectors with homogenous goods and competition in quan-
tities can be seen as sectors characterized by standard production processes
employing low-skilled workers: for these sectors, we have seen that business
destruction due to globalization is radical.
Therefore, in the presence of labor market imperfections, the consequences
of globalization can be worse for the low-skilled workers and can potentially lead
to their unemployment and to larger income disparities between them and the
skilled workers. For this reason, the gains from trade due to globalization and
associated with lower prices are often criticized for their consequences on income
distribution and for the increase in the inequality between low productivity
workers and high productivity workers.
The EMSs approach provides further insights on issues of income distribution
that we should emphasize in this context. Contrary to the neoclassical approach,
our approach is able to generate an interesting evolution for the distribution of
income between extra proﬁts (in the form of dividends and capital gains) and
labor income (or remuneration of the inputs in general). In the short run, a
boom is associated with an increase of both forms of income but with a larger
increase for the latter due to the stronger competition between ﬁrms. Vice
versa, in a downturn, the mark ups tend to increase and the fraction of income
accruing to the factors of production shrinks (the procyclicality of the labor
share would require further empirical investigations).
In a long term perspective, the process of globalization may generate a pos-
itive eﬀect on labor income, since the associated increase in competition may
shift part of the surplus from proﬁts toward labor income. Again, in the pres-
ence of labor market frictions, it may take time before globalization exerts its
beneﬁts on the workers, but the ultimate impact is going to be positive. For
these reasons, the protectionist tendencies that are emerging during the current
crisis may have negative consequences in the medium-long run for the global
economy.
254 Growth Driven by Leaders
Understanding the determinants of growth and the reasons for which diﬀeren-
tials in growth rates are so large is fundamental to foster economic progress
around the world. While growth in developing countries is largely associated
with the process of industrialization through established technologies and with
the accumulation of physical and human capital in the neoclassical sense, growth
in the Western developed countries is largely driven by the continuous process
of expansion of the technological frontier.
Technology-driven growth is mainly due to the innovations of ﬁrms investing
in R&D to create new or better products and replace the existing ones (Romer,
1990, and Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Proﬁts, associated with innovations and
temporarily protected through IPRs, provide the incentives to invest in R&D
for ﬁrms in high-tech sectors, and the structure of the competition between
these ﬁr m si sac r u c i a le l e m e n to ft h ee n g i n eo fg r o w t h . T h eE M S sa p p r o a c h
has widely examined this structure, endogenizing strategic interactions in the
investment choices and the entry process, and it has been also focused on the
peculiar role of market leaders.
Entry of ﬁrms in the competition for the market is primarily driven by the
size of the expected proﬁts from innovations, and therefore it is directly related
to the strength of IPRs protection. This protection, as the legal enforcement
of contracts and the protection of the same physical property rights, is one of
the founding elements of the free market economies,29 and possibly the most
important, since dynamic growth (rather than static wealth) relies on it. Of
course, entry changes the nature of the strategic interactions between investors,
increasing aggregate investment and reducing the expected proﬁtability (per
ﬁrm) at rates that depend on the substitutability or complementarity between
the investments of the ﬁrms. The entry process is exhausted when the expected
return on R&D investment is the same as the return on alternative investments,
and this equilibrium determines the aggregate rate of technological progress.
The endogeneity of entry plays a crucial role in the decision of technological
leaders to invest in R&D to perpetuate their status: leaders tend to invest
less than their rivals and to reduce the aggregate investment when they face
an exogenous number of competitors, but they tend to invest more and to
increase the aggregate investment when they face an endogenous number of
investors trying to replace the leading technology. For this reason, it can be
highly misleading to evaluate the competitiveness of a dynamic market on the
basis of its concentration level or of the market share of its leader without
concern for the entry conditions (this is a common mistake done by antitrust
authorities).
The hypothesis for which leaders invest more in R&D if and only if they face
a strong entry pressure has been tested in Czarnitzki, Etro and Kraft (2008)
29See the Intertic Lecture by Dixit (2008) on this topic.
26on a unique dataset of the German manufacturing sector, the Mannheim Inno-
vation Panel, which includes a wide number of ﬁrm level data and answers to
a survey with a special focus on innovation.30 A novel aspect of this research
is given by the fact that the same ﬁrms provide a subjective view on the key
determinants of R&D intensity, the entry pressure and the leadership. Rather
than determining arbitrarily the size and composition of a market, assigning a
degree of entry intensity in a discretionary way, and assigning a status of leader-
ship on the basis of predetermined variables, the questionnaire of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel allows one to ask the same ﬁrms to identify the size of their
main market, the existence of an endogenous threat of entry in the market and
the identity of the leader in the market. Using standard control variables as em-
ployment, capital intensity, stock of IPRs and sector dummies, the econometric
investigation provides interesting results. Apparently, incumbent leaders invest
slightly less than the average followers, with a diﬀerence that is not signiﬁcant.
However, this apparently uniform behavior hides a very diﬀerent reality, which
emerges when we control for endogenous entry pressure. The presence of such
an entry pressure leads the average ﬁrm to invest less, but when the ﬁrm is
an incumbent leader in its main market, this leader increases its investment in
R&D above the investment of the average ﬁrm.31 This conﬁrms the main pre-
dictions of the EMSs approach, for which market leaders are more innovative if
and only if they are pressured by endogenous entry.
In the presence of sequential innovations, the consequence of the impact of
the entry pressure on the investment of the leaders is somewhat paradoxical: the
likelihood of persistence of leadership is high exactly when there is endogenous
entry in the competition for the market (and not when there is high market
power of the leader). Therefore, growth is mainly driven by the investments
of the market leaders to perpetuate their positions under the pressure of rival
ﬁrms. We can summarize this result with:
P r i n c i p l e4 . G r o w t hi sd r i v e nb yt h ep r o c e s so fb u s i n e s sc r e -
ation and enhanced by a strategic leadership of patentholders in
the competition for the market, which creates endogenous persis-
tence of their technological leadership.
As we have seen, the New Economy is key to the engine of world growth
because it is often associated with GPT innovations that spread their beneﬁts in
other sectors. For instance, this is the case of innovations in hardware, software,
online business and advertising. Moreover, we have suggested that the leaders
of these sectors contribute to drive global technological progress. Etro (2007,a,
Chapter 6) provides a wide discussion of the software market in the perspective
of the EMSs approach, with particular attention to the role of Microsoft as a
30See Czarnitzki, Etro and Kraft (2008).
31For a fascinating introduction to the discriminating power of econometric analysis see
Levitt and Dubner (2005).
27leader forced by endogenous entry pressures to invest a lot in R&D. The software
market is not only characterized by endogenous entry at the global level in the
competition for the market, but also in the competition in the market, which
forces the leader to implement aggressive strategies (low pricing, bundling) with
competitive purposes: for this reason, the large market share of Microsoft should
not be necessarily seen as a consequence of market power.
Leaving that reference to the interested reader, here we want to present
a microeconomic digression on a related market of the New Economy, whose
structure is characterized by endogenous entry in the competition for the market
(through investments in innovation), but not in the competition in the market
(not through prices). This market will probably play an important role in future
economic scenarios.
4.1 Online advertising: market structure and innovation
Advertising is at the basis of any process of business creation and diﬀusion, and
its eﬃciency is crucial for all sectors. It is calculated that worldwide spending on
total advertising is currently around $ 600 billions, of which at least 40 billions
are spent in the online ﬁeld, half in the U.S., a third in the E.U. Since 1994,
when HotWire sold the ﬁrst banner for advertising, and 1995, when Infoseek
introduced search-based advertising, online ads have been constantly growing
in all of their diﬀerent forms: search advertising associated with search engines
(40 % of online advertising), display advertising (30 %), classiﬁed listings on web
sites (20 %), email advertising (2 %) and others. The current crisis has stopped
only temporary the growth of the online market. This is destined to increase
its share in total advertising for the following reasons: the Internet is rapidly
growing and the large majority of websites generates revenues from advertising;
other devices as mobiles and televisions will be always more often connected
to the Internet; software innovation allows more eﬃcient mechanisms to reach
targeted consumers on the basis of the characteristics of search through the
keyword bidding system and of the websites visited (contextual advertising), and
in perspective on the basis of the characteristics of the Internet users (behavioral
advertising).
Advertising in general is a two-sided market, in the sense that there are
platforms that attract viewers and sell their access to the advertisers. These
typically multi-home and pay for access based on the amount of space they
obtain and who they reach. Online advertising provides new ways to attract
viewers, and new and better ways to link advertisers to their targets. This
happens in the two main sub-markets of online advertising, search and display
advertising, whose structures will be the focus of our attention.
Let us start with search advertising, which accounts for about 40 % of on-
line advertising. Many search queries on the Internet are a potential source of
business transaction, therefore advertisers place their ads next to search engine
results through second price auctions on the keywords that match the content
28of their ads and lead Internet users to click on their advertisement: charges are
typically for each click on the ad (PPC, price per click), and the highest bid
for each keyword association wins, but the price is given by the second highest
bid. Therefore, the revenue per search, RPS, on a particular platform is given
by RPS = APS · CPA· PPC,w h e r eAPS is the Ads per search and CPA is
the clicks per Ad.32
The market is characterized by strong network eﬀects in the sense that the
search engine that reaches most Internet users is more valuable to advertisers.
Consequently there is a strong competition for the market to develop the lead-
ing search engine, which leads the dominant ﬁrm to invest a lot in R&D and
maintain its leadership, but a limited competition in the market between the
main search engines, which allows these, and the dominant one in particular,
to apply substantial mark ups. As well known, Google is currently the leading
search engine, with about 60 % search traﬃc in U.S., against almost 20 % of
Yahoo! and less than 10 % of Microsoft’s Live, but with even higher market
shares, often above 90 %, in other parts of the world.33
Competition for the market is strong and crucial since access to search en-
gines is free and simple, and most users employ the search engine that is regarded
as the most valuable (for the quality of the search results and ad relevance), even
if they often use more than one. In the absence of substantial product diﬀer-
entiation (limited to search tools and page layouts), network eﬀects and lock in
eﬀects naturally lead to a single dominant player in the market for search adver-
tising. Today Google dominates this lucrative business and the lack of genuine
entry pressure in the competition in the market allows it to apply higher mark
ups to advertisers than its main competitors. Google AdWords (launched in
2000) charges double prices than its two main rivals (Yahoo! and Microsoft)
and accounts today for about 70 % of search advertising revenue worldwide.
Let us move to the second main ﬁeld of online advertising, display advertis-
ing. Part of this market concerns the direct placement of banner ads on third-
party publishers, which represents the direct (or reserved) channel, the valuable
ad inventory that large web publishers directly negotiate with the advertisers
(through their direct sale forces). However, most of the advertising space avail-
able on large websites and typically all of the space available on small and
medium size websites cannot be sold in direct negotiations. Therefore, most of
it is sold through indirect intermediaries that buy the so-called “remnant” ad in-
ventory from publishers and sell it to advertisers. This can be seen as a separate
market from the direct channel. Google and its recent acquisition DoubleClick
32Google adopts a sophisticated quality scoring technology that displays and orders ads
based on expected revenue (CPA · PPC) to maximize RPS; Yahoo! and Microsoft have
introduced sophisticated quality scoring algorithms more recently.
33The exceptions are Japan where Yahoo! is the leader, China with Baidu, South Korea
with NHK, and Russia with Yandex. Notice that Yahoo! has been the leader in the U.S. until
2002. Before 2000 Yahoo! was followed by Altavista, in 2001 by Microsoft and in 2002 by
Google, which subsequently took the lead.
29play a major role in the market for intermediation services for remnant ad in-
ventory. Google provides vertically integrated intermediation platform between
online web publishers and advertisers: Google’s AdSense, which publishers use
to dedicate ad space to Google contextual ads, reaches more than 80 % of the ad
revenue in the indirect channel with integrated ad networks. The Google plat-
form targets advertising to the relevant websites, and pays the web publishers
with a large percentage of its revenues; meanwhile advertisers buy inventories
from the platform. DoubleClick oﬀe r sa na ds e r v i n ga n da dm a n a g e m e n tp r o d -
uct, DART, for publishers and advertisers. Such a publisher tool manages the
inventory of a website, receives the ads from ad networks and delivers them in
the relevant inventory (according to the behavioral history of Internet users),
usually at a ﬁxed cost per thousand impressions which is a small percentage of
the price that the web publisher charges on the advertisers. The market share
of ad revenue served by DoubleClick in the indirect channel with non-integrated
ad networks is around 75 %. Since almost 60% of online advertising taking place
through the indirect channel adopts integrated intermediation, after the 2007
merger, Google with DoubleClick controls about 80 % of the worldwide market.
As the market for search advertising, also the market for display advertising
is characterized by endogenous entry in the competition for the market, but
not in the competition in the market, with Yahoo! and Microsoft providing the
only alternatives to Google in the short-medium run.34 In this scenario, the
merger between Google and DoubleClick substantially relaxed price competi-
tion and allowed them to increase their mark ups on publishers and advertisers.
As a reaction, in February 2008 Microsoft made an oﬀer to buy Yahoo! and
create a stronger search platform with the size and the network eﬀects needed
to compete with Google. Yahoo!’s board has stopped this attempt by exploring
strategic alternatives, including a commercial deal with the market leader (to
deliver relevant Google ads alongside Yahoo!’s own search results), which would
have reduced competition even further. After the withdrawal of that deal in
November 2008 under the pressure of the U.S. Department of Justice, the posi-
tion of Yahoo! in the market has become even weaker, and Google has remained
dominant and unconstrained by endogenous entry threats.
Future alliances and technological advances will crucially shape the structure
of this crucial market for the global economy. Competition and innovation (by
the leader and the followers as well) in a sector like this will exert a positive
impact on the other sectors and on the aggregate economy, especially in a time of
crisis as the current one. For this reason it is important that a strong innovative
34Switching to a diﬀerent tool involves high sunk costs in terms of substantial investments in
software, in training the staﬀ, coding all of the publisher’s web pages, creating novel datasets,
transferring ad campaigns to the system and so on, with all the associated business risk. For
the same reason, multi-homing (with multiple non-integrated ad networks) is highly ineﬃcient
in this case. These high switching costs and the diﬃculty of building alternative high quality
intermediation services represent a substantial barrier to entry of new ﬁrms in the short and
medium run, which is the relevant time frame in such a rapidly evolving market.
30pressure on Google remains in the competition for this market, and that a
stronger competitive pressure emerges in the competition in t h em a r k e to fo n l i n e
advertising.
5D y n a m i c I n e ﬃciency
How much a country should save? By saving a lot a country can invest a lot and
substantially improve the conditions of the future generations, but meanwhile
consumption of the current generations is penalized. By saving less, a country
privileges current consumption over growth. Apparently the right choice is just
a matter of preferences, but this is not always true. There is a limit beyond
which a country should never go: excessive savings may create such a large
potential production that the country will not be even able to absorb it in the
long run (Phelps, 1961). In these situations, the country could make current and
future generations better oﬀ by simply reducing the rate of savings (this would
expand current consumption without penalizing future consumption). Dynamic
ineﬃciencies of this kind are only a theoretical possibility in the neoclassical
framework, but they become a concrete chance in a world where markets are
characterized by more realistic EMSs.
When we depart from a perfectly competitive world to introduce imperfect
competition, we can expect that some forms of ineﬃciencies emerge. Neverthe-
less, it is not obvious in which directions they should go in general equilibrium:
in the competition in the market, should we expect excessive concentration and
mark ups? or too many ﬁrms and too small mark ups? Likewise, in the com-
petition for the market, should we expect a number of ﬁrms and an aggregate
investment in R&D above or below the eﬃcient levels? The general answers
to these questions are much more clear-cut than what one could expect on the
basis of casual intuitions. It turns out that under fairly general conditions, the
number of ﬁrms is excessive both under competition in the market and for the
market and, under more restrictive conditions, this form of excessive entry may
lead to persistent negative consequences, namely dynamic ineﬃciency.
The excessive entry result is related to the fact that, whenever there are few
ﬁrms, entry of a new one exerts a strong negative externality on the proﬁtabil-
ity of the incumbents, but this externality is irrelevant for the actual choice of
entry. This phenomenon is well known in the theory of industrial organization
as the business stealing eﬀect, but it makes its appearance in a general equi-
librium context with implications for long run consumption levels exactly when
we introduce EMSs, that is strategic interactions and endogenous entry.
The dynamic ineﬃciency result emerges in the presence of competition in
quantities in the market when the agents are extremely patient. In such a case,
agents save a lot, which leads to excessive investments in business creation and
to the proliferation of too many small ﬁrms. Consider the particular case of
ﬁrms producing homogenous goods: the creation of new ﬁrms is a poor way to
31increase production (relative to an increase in the individual production of the
existing ﬁrms), since it requires a pure waste of resources in ﬁxed costs of en-
t r y .B e c a u s eo ft h i sw a s t e ,c o n s u m e r sc o u l db eb e t t e ro ﬀ reducing their savings
to increase current consumption without reducing long run consumption. A
similar phenomenon takes place in the competition for the market: savings are
wasted in excessive creation of ﬁrms duplicating investments in R&D to replace
each other, and a reallocation of resources could increase current consumption
without penalizing long run growth. Of course, when investment creates steady
growth, the damages of the ineﬃciency of the market structure are quite dra-
matic. Countries characterized by excessively small ﬁrms could grow at higher
rates if they experienced a process of concentration leading to larger ﬁrms.
Summarizing, we have:
Principle 5. In the long run, the EMSs can be characterized
by dynamic inefficiency in terms of excessive savings and too many
small firms active in the competition in the market and for the
market.
5.1 Italian SMEs: too much of a good thing?
While the problem of the size of ﬁrms may appear a theoretical curiosity rather
than a concrete threat, a possible example of this pathology in the mechanism of
business creation has emerged in a country traditionally characterized by a high
savings rate and whose growth performance has been quite poor in the last two
decades: Italy. The industrial structure of this country has been traditionally
characterized by a large number of SMEs whose innovative capacity is quite
limited (compared to larger corporations) and whose focus, in the last two
decades, has gradually moved away from the top high-tech sectors (at least
relative to other developed countries). The reasons for the lack of growth in the
size of Italian ﬁrms have been usually associated with the family-based structure
of Italian capitalism or with credit rationing problems, but the endogenous
tendency toward small innovative ﬁrms suggested here may be part of the story
(also because one of the possible solutions, that is R&D subsidization, has been
always limited in Italy compared to other Western countries).
It is probably not by chance that the Italian endogenous response (without
proper equivalents around the world) to this problem has been the coordination
of some innovative activities through “industrial districts”, that is organizations
of multiple SMEs from the same sector, typically located in the same geograph-
ical area, to invest in R&D and other productivity enhancing activities on a
larger scale.35
35Notice, however, that the lack of large corporations in high-tech sectors is also a problem
in other European countries compared to the United States.
326 Fiscal Policy
The departure from a perfectly competitive environment and the emergence of
ineﬃciencies lead naturally to a new role for ﬁscal policy in the EMSs approach.
For instance, as a consequence of the dynamic ineﬃciency emphasized in the
previous section and due to excessive investment in business creation, our theory
suggests that it would be optimal to correct this steady state distortion with
a production subsidy that leads ﬁrms to increase their individual production,
and an R&D subsidy that leads ﬁrms to invest more in innovative activities.
The former instrument should be associated with a wage subsidy to implement
the optimal allocation of resources (investment and labor) in the competition
in the market. The latter instrument should be associated with an appropriate
capital income or proﬁt taxation, or with an appropriate entry fee/subsidy to
target the right number of ﬁrms active in the innovative activity and reach the
optimal growth rate.
However, ﬁscal policy plays a more interesting role outside of the steady
state (Bilbiie et al.,a, 2008a). The reason is that, contrary to a New-Keynesian
environment where ﬁrms behave as independent monopolists, strategic interac-
tions and endogenous entry lead to a complex impact of the ﬁscal tools along the
transition path to the steady state. In particular, ﬁscal policy needs to change
along the gradual process of entry because the ineﬃciencies in the allocation of
resources are deeper when the number of ﬁrms is low and they are smaller when
the number of ﬁr m si sc l o s e rt ot h ee ﬃcient level. The same eﬃcient number
of ﬁrms trades oﬀ the advantages of increased product variety and quality with
the disadvantages of the costs of business creation. When competition in the
market is still characterized by a small number of ﬁrms it is optimal to subsidize
production and labor supply, or to reduce sales taxes and wage taxes. Since the
number of ﬁrms is positively correlated with output along the transition path
and over the business cycle, this implies that ﬁscal policy and also the optimal
tax rates should be countercyclical.
Apparently, the result on the countercyclicality of the optimal ﬁscal pol-
icy is in line with a wide consensus in both the neoclassical and Keynesian
approaches. However, here it derives from diﬀerent reasons and it has more
radical implications.
In the Keynesian approach it is the stabilizing role of government interven-
tion on the demand side that leads to a countercyclical ﬁscal policy implemented
with deﬁcit spending in recessions and budget surpluses in boom (Keynes, 1936).
In the neoclassical approach, a countercyclical ﬁscal policy is the result of the
principle of tax smoothing, for which constant tax rates are optimal to mini-
mize the tax distortions on the supply side, so that the public deﬁcit increases
in recessions and decreases in booms (Barro, 1979).
In the EMSs approach the distortions are endogenously induced by the
strategic interactions and by entry choices in decentralized markets, they get
worse in recession when competition is weaker, and they are reduced in boom,
33when competition is stronger. Therefore, the optimal ﬁscal policy minimizes
these market distortions with an expansive role that must be stronger in reces-
sion and weaker in boom (under both lump sum taxes and distorsive taxes). In
other words, the optimal ﬁscal policy has to minimize the market distortions
rather than the tax distortions, and it has also to stabilize the economy through
the supply side rather than the demand side. Finally, the optimal tax rates on
sales and labor income should be reduced during recessions and increased during
booms: this result on countercyclical tax rates is in contrast with the traditional
tax smoothing principle and in favor of an active policy on the supply side. We
can summarize these results as follows:
Principle 6. The optimal fiscal policy requires countercylical
taxes on production and labor, R&D subsidies and capital income
taxation.
The general necessity of capital income taxation or proﬁt taxation emerges
in an endogenous growth context, where ﬁscal policy has to target both the
eﬃcient EMSs and the eﬃcient long run growth rate. This result is in radical
contrast with one of the main policy prescriptions of the neoclassical model, for
which steady state capital income taxation should be zero. In the neoclassical
framework the taxation of the return on capital aﬀects the marginal productivity
of capital and distorts capital accumulation, therefore it is optimal to avoid it
i nt h el o n gr u n .I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fE M S s, the taxation of capital income aﬀects
the net return of investment in business creation, and a reduction of this return
obtained through this form of taxation is beneﬁcial when decentralized entry is
excessive and needs to be limited.
6.1 Fiscal policy in the U.S. and the E.U.
In the last decades U.S. ﬁscal policy has been often used in a countercyclical
way, leading to surpluses during booms and deﬁcits during recessionary phases.
The most recent examples were the tax cut adopted by Bush at the beginning
of 2008 and the recovery plan adopted by Obama at the beginning of 2009, the
largest American ﬁscal stimulus package of all times.
At the beginning of 2008 the widespread dispersion of credit risk and the
unclear eﬀects of the subprime crisis on the ﬁnancial institutions reduced the in-
centives to invest and to demand (and obtain) credit. Commercial papers for the
ﬁnance of corporate business (mainly ﬁrms’ working capital) collapsed,36 lead-
ing to negative implications for business and job creation. The risks of further
impact on the real economy and the real estate downturn were primary de-
terminants of the Economic Stimulus Act signed by the Bush Administration.
This $152 billion package introduced tax rebates to low- and middle-income
36Between the third quarters of 2007 and 2008 U.S. nominal GDP was still growing by 3.4
%, but commercial paper outstanding was decreasing by 25 %.
34U.S. taxpayers and tax incentives to stimulate investment, and it relaxed pru-
dential controls over government-sponsored mortgage lenders with the purpose
of keeping real estate ﬁnance ﬂowing. Unfortunately, the margins to stimulate
aggregate demand were quite limited. Given the high current account deﬁcit
of the U.S. and the weak Dollar of the time, the only chance for such a ﬁscal
package to stimulate the economy was by gradually restoring the incentives to
create new business or to export. This did not happen because, as we have seen,
the ﬁnancial crisis got worse in the second half of 2008.
In front of such a dramatic scenario, the new President Barack Obama has
launched a massive Recovery Plan of $ 787 million spread over 2009 to 2013,
including mainly new public spending in education, health care, energy and
infrastructures, a tax cut, an expansion of unemployment beneﬁts and other
social welfare provisions. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act is
clearly inspired by a Keynesian philosophy and aimed at raising aggregate do-
mestic demand at the cost of increasing the public deﬁcit (and adopting some
protectionist measures, as “Buy American” policies). The problem is that given
the already high propensity to consume of the American citizens, an additional
stimulus to private consumption may be partially ineﬀective: rather than spend-
ing, most Americans will simply repay their debts or start saving. It is true that
a plan of additional public spending may increase aggregate demand, but on one
side the associated additional burden of public debt may crowd out part of this
increase, and on the other side the marginal return of additional public spending
may be quite low in terms of business creation (relative to the return of private
spending). Finally, it takes time before a ﬁscal stimulus exerts any impact on
the economy, especially when largely based on long run public investments.
The IMF estimates that the size of the U.S. stimulus directly active in 2009
should be at least 2 % of GDP: together with the rescue packages ﬁnanced
by the government, this expansionary ﬁscal policy is expected to increase the
U.S. public deﬁcit beyond 13 % of GDP in 2009, and to substantially increase
American public debt toward 100 % of GDP for the years to come. In spite of
such an impressive and unprecedented policy of deﬁcit spending, we doubt that
this will be the key factor to trigger a quick recovery. Even if the ﬁnancial crisis
has not eroded the physical capital or aﬀected productivity, we believe that
an expansion of the aggregate demand alone is not going to bring production
back to its full-employment level in a short time (contrary to what both the
Keynesian approach and the neoclassical approach may suggest). The reason is
that the structure of the aggregate supply changes during a recession: when net
business creation falls, when ﬁrms restrict production, when market structures
become more concentrated and mark ups tend to increase, then the supply side
is not going to satisfy anymore the same full-employment level of production as
before. It takes time and further investments to recover the earlier supply levels,
and a simple demand-based ﬁscal policy cannot succeed alone in the short term:
there is the need for a supply-based ﬁscal policy.
Under the current conditions, we believe that it would have been better
35to focus the stimulus more on private investment, in particular enhancing the
incentives to create new business. The U.S. have been consuming more than
they were producing for more than a decade thanks to substantial imports: this
imbalance needs to be cured by increasing production and exports (and not
by decreasing imports with passive protectionist measures). Fiscal incentives
for new enterprises, lower sales taxes and corporate taxes, export subsidies and
R&D subsidies would have a better chance to promote the recovery in this
moment.
As well known, continental Europe is characterized by a larger role of the
government compared to the U.S., a richer (but sometimes less eﬃcient) welfare
state, stronger automatic stabilizers and more rigid labor markets with stronger
unions. For this and other reasons, including diﬀerences in the political systems,
t h er o l eo fd i s c r e t i o n a r yﬁscal policy for stabilization purposes has been some-
times more limited. Moreover, the creation of the E.U. has set additional limits
to the discretionality of national governments in adopting countercyclical ﬁscal
policies (even if their rigid implementation has been avoided in the last years).
The same E.U. has a limited spending capability and a limited role in coordi-
nating ﬁscal policies, a role that would have been precious during the current
crisis, as many observers have noticed. The reaction of European governments
t ot h er e c e s s i o nh a sb e e nw e a k e rt h a ni nt h eU . S . ,w i t hs m a l ls t i m u l u sp a c k a g e s
in France and Italy (respectively 0.7 % and 0.2 % of GDP) and larger ones in
Spain (1.1 %), United Kingdom (1.4 %) and Germany (1.5 %), but this does not
take into account the role of automatic stabilizers:37 therefore, also the Euro-
pean ﬁscal expansion has been in line with traditional Keynesian prescriptions
of a substantial deﬁcit spending.38
Most European packages are mainly focused on supporting aggregate de-
mand through new investments in domestic public infrastructures and support
to domestic ﬁrms in bad conditions. Also in this case, limited attention has been
given to the support of business creation and we are not aware of any attempt
to reduce tax rates on the supply side even temporarily.
The IMF has calculated that more than a trillion Dollars will be concretely
invested in stimulus packages worldwide during 2009 - much more has been (and
probably will be) promised for the following years also in a coordinated manner.
To have an idea of the size of these eﬀorts, notice that 2008 worldwide nominal
GDP is estimated in $ 78 trillion, of which 18.9 produced in the European
Union, 14.3 in the United States, 4.8 in Japan, 4.2 in China, 1.7 in Russia
37Data are from the IMF and refer to planned interventions directly aimed at stimulating
the recovery in 2009. Large stimulus packages have been implemented also in Saudi Arabia
(3.3 % of GDP), China (2.0 %), Canada (1.5 %), South Korea (1.5 %) and Japan (1.4 % but
with more to come, in spite of the world largest debt-GDP ratio, above 170 %). Of course,
additional (coordinated) eﬀorts may emerge during the rest of the year.
38Overall, public ﬁnances are going to largely deteriorate since 2009, with public deﬁcits
expected well beyond the Maastricht limit of 3 % of GDP: around 10 % in U.K., Ireland and
Spain (where, however, initial debt levels are low compared to the Maastricht limit of 60 %
of GDP), and on average above 5 % in the Euroarea.
36and Brasil, 1.6 in Canada, 1.2 in India, 1.1 in Mexico and one trillion Dollars
in Australia.39 This means that from a global perspective we are in front of
a stimulus package of more than 1 % of world GDP, a percentage that may
increase in the next months, possibly through international ﬁscal coordination.
However, we believe that the large size of this unprecedented global stimulus is
not a suﬃcient condition to trigger the recovery. What matters is the way this
money will be spent, whether to push aggregate demand and public investments
only (as now seems to be the case), or also to boost aggregate supply, business
creation and trade.
6.2 A supply-based ﬁscal policy
T h eE M S sa p p r o a c hs u g g e s t se x a c t l yt h en e c e s s i t yo fa ni n t e r v e n t i o no nt h e
supply side rather than on the demand side during recessions. According to
the conventional wisdom, when the market activity declines one can stimulate
the aggregate demand by artiﬁcially augmenting private and public spending,
so as to force ﬁrms to produce more. This is the typical recipe given by (Key-
nesian) economists, but there is an alternative way to look at the problem and
ﬁnd solutions. Loosely speaking, market demand increases not only when avail-
able income is higher, but also when prices are lower (relative to the wages),
that is when the mark ups are lower. In a world of constant mark ups (as
the neoclassical one with perfect competition or the New-Keynesian one with
monopolistic ﬁr m s )am a r ku pr e d u c t i o nc a nn e v e ro c c u r ,b u ti naw o r l dw i t h
endogenous mark ups and entry this can happen whenever policy stimulates
business creation. Any policy aimed at promoting entry and innovation is going
to strengthen competition, reduce the mark ups and increase the real wages.
This increases the aggregate supply and attracts demand. In front of the lim-
ited success of policies aimed at supporting aggregate demand to promote the
recovery, we may start thinking seriously about policies aimed at supporting
aggregate supply.
Fiscal policy can promote business creation acting either on expected prof-
itability or on the ﬁxed costs of entry. On the ﬁrst element, one can act on cor-
porate taxes, capital income taxation and other taxes whose incidence is born
by the production side, including production and labor taxation. In particular,
a heavy but temporary reduction of the indirect taxation on sales and direct
taxation on proﬁts could generate substantial positive eﬀects on consumption
and proﬁts, and therefore on entry and production, and could induce signiﬁcant
reductions of the mark ups. Moreover, the impact on the economy of these tax
39Data are from CIA World Factbook updated on March 19 at the oﬃcial exchange rate.
Within Europe, Germany has an estimated GDP of $ 3.8 trillion, France 3, U.K. 2.8, Italy
2.4 and Spain 1.7. The diﬀerences are smaller after adjusting for PPP: the E.U. remains the
largest world market with $ 15 trillion, followed by U.S. with 14.6, China with 7.8 and India
with 3.3 (as a consequence of the current crisis, we expect that the catch up of China on U.S.
will occurr at the beginning of the twenties, at least in PPP terms).
37cuts could be quite rapid, as opposed to the slow impact of increases in public
spending (especially for infrastructures) and of cuts on general income taxes.
On the second element of the supply side, the ﬁxed costs of business creation,
one can act on subsidies for business creation, on temporary reductions of reg-
ulatory constraints to new business activities, especially in key sectors (as the
construction sector), on temporary tax exemptions for new SMEs, on R&D sub-
sidies aimed at promoting new and innovative products and on export subsidies
aimed at extending business activities abroad.
The need for a supply-based ﬁscal policy is by no means new. However,
it has been largely neglected in macroeconomic theory, which has been often
biased toward a demand-based ﬁscal policy in the Keynesian tradition (which
assumes a ﬂat aggregate supply equation) or toward a neutral tax smoothing
policy in the neoclassical tradition (which assumes a ﬁxed aggregate supply and
limits the scope of ﬁscal policy to the minimization of tax distortions). In front
of the policy ineﬀectiveness of repeated plans of ﬁscal stimulus based on support
to the aggregate demand, it could be useful to point out the opportunity of a
larger, and maybe complementary, support to the aggregate supply.
7 Monetary Policy
The neoclassical approach to monetary policy in a frictionless economy generates
t h en e u t r a l i t yo fi n ﬂation for the real economy and suggests the optimality of a
zero nominal interest rate associated with a negative inﬂation rate and a negative
growth rate of money supply (Friedman, 1968). The New-Keynesian literature
has shown that in the presence of monopolistic behavior by an exogenous number
of ﬁrms and nominal rigidities in price-setting, the real allocation of resources is
aﬀected by inﬂation (see Mankiw, 1985, and Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). In
this environment, the optimal policy requires monetary authorities to actively
manage the nominal interest rate committing to a rule that links the latter to
inﬂationary expectations and the output gap, as in the Taylor rule (see Taylor,
1993, and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997).
When the structure of the markets is endogenous, inﬂation and monetary
policy have new roles compared to those emerging under monopolistic behavior
by an exogenous number of ﬁrms. In particular, nominal rigidities aﬀect the
real proﬁts of each ﬁrm with consequences both on the strategic interactions
between them and, most of all, on the process of entry of new ﬁrms. The EMSs
approach has emphasized static and dynamic consequences of this, studying the
role of monetary shocks on the economy and revisiting the characterization of
the optimal monetary policy.
The basic principle can be summarized as follows:
Principle 7. The optimal monetary policy has to implement the
inflation rate which minimizes the distortions on the process of
38Figure 7: Oﬃcial interest rates of Fed and ECB (January 1999 - November
2008).
business creation due the negative effect of nominal rigidities on
the expected profits.
The new role of inﬂation and, consequently, of monetary policy emerges in
a basic general equilibrium framework where inﬂation acts as a distortionary
tax on ﬁrms proﬁts and biases the allocation of resources between production of
goods and business creation against the latter (Bilbiie et al.,a, 2008b). Under
these conditions, as long as ﬁscal policy can take care of the ineﬃciencies in
the market structures, the optimal monetary policy should simply avoid mark
up non-synchronization by implementing producer price stability (while leaving
the mismeasured consumer price index to ﬂuctuate because of the endogenous
entry process).
Moreover, the EMSs approach could be useful also to study optimal mone-
tary policy along the business cycle in the absence of optimal ﬁscal policy. Then,
during recessions monetary policy should stimulate entry (which is below the
optimal level) through reductions of the nominal and real interest rates aimed
at increasing the (stock market) value of ﬁrms and promoting investments in
business creation, and during booms it should limit excessive investments in
business entry with a tight monetary policy. In practice, since output stabiliza-
tion requires the stabilization of the entry process and, therefore, of the (stock
market) value of the ﬁrms, we suggest that including equity price stabilization
in the targets of the monetary authority could be useful (indeed many central
39banks have been occasionally active in the stock market with this purpose in
the last years).
When growth is endogenous and depends on technological progress, inﬂa-
tion plays a similar role in distorting the business creation process, but it now
leads to more radical consequences. In a Schumpeterian world, what drives
the aggregate investment of the ﬁrms in R&D is the proﬁtability of the fu-
ture innovations, which depends on the level of protection of the intellectual
property rights, but also on the appropriability of the rents from innovation
through proﬁt maximizing strategies. When nominal price changes are costly,
proﬁt maximizing strategies cannot be implemented in a systematic way. Firms
choose mark ups that are increasing in the expected rate of inﬂation between
the current price adjustment and the next one, but their proﬁts are gradually
eroded until that adjustment occurs. Even if the negative impact on the real
proﬁts is small because price adjustments are frequent, this impact aﬀects neg-
atively the incentives to invest for all the ﬁrms, reducing long run growth. Of
course, this induces a non-negligible impact on the aggregate economy over time:
accordingly, non-zero inﬂation decreases the rate of technological progress with
permanent consequences on welfare. Therefore, when the objective is simply to
maximize growth, price stabilization is optimal.
M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,t h ed i s t o r s i v er o l eo fi n ﬂation on the incentives to invest in
R&D induces an inverse-U relation between inﬂation and growth: in particular,
and in line with the evidence, for moderate and high levels of inﬂation, the
growth rate is decreasing in the inﬂation rate because the incentives to invest
in innovation are reduced. Notice that, when the decentralized rate of growth
under price stabilization is not optimal (as typically is the case), and there are
distortions that cannot be fully eliminated through the ﬁscal incentives, a non-
zero rate of inﬂation can be welfare maximizing. This outcome is more realistic
since Central Banks around the world, including the Fed and the ECB, target
low but positive inﬂation rates, and not zero inﬂation.
7.1 Monetary policy in the U.S. and the E.U.
In the last two decades most monetary authorities have formally committed to
anti-inﬂationary policies, often adopting explicit inﬂation targets. Nevertheless,
some of them have been also engaged in policies that were clearly aimed at
output stabilization. These policies have been typically implemented through
increases in the nominal interest rates in front of inﬂationary expectations and
reductions of the same rates in front of reductions of the inﬂation. According
to the leading view, when the reactions of the nominal interest rates are strong
enough (according to the Taylor rule, a 1.5 % change of the interest rate for
a 1 % change of the inﬂation rate), they aﬀect the real economy through the
impact on the real interest rate (which is the diﬀerence between nominal rates
a n de x p e c t e di n ﬂation). For instance, in front of increased inﬂationary expecta-
tions, a temporary increase of the nominal interest rate, which increases the real
40interest rate as well, is expected to reduce current consumption (and investment
in business creation), which slows down the economy and tends to reduce the
inﬂation. On the other side, in front of a slowdown of the economy, a reduction
of the interest rates is expected to promote consumption (and business creation)
so as to trigger the recovery.
With the Chairman Alan Greenspan and his follower Ben Bernanke, the
U.S. Federal Reserve has been quite active in the stabilization of the American
economy,40 implementing a tight monetary policy in booms and an expansionary
one in recessions. For instance, a drastic reduction of the interest rates has
been implemented in the aftermath of September 11, and another one during
the last two years to contrast the current recession, arriving to nominal rates
close to zero (see Fig. 7). After reaching this lower bound of the interest rate
policy (nominal interest rates cannot be negative), a further expansionary policy
requires a direct increase of money supply. Therefore, the Fed has implemented
a form of “credit easing” by pumping new liquidity into markets. In the last
months, it has expanded its discount operations in particular with the creation
of special loan facilities (as the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility), has issued
direct injections of capital into the main banks,41 some of which are still in
troubles, has promoted direct lending from government-sponsored enterprises
and has bought corporate debt. The hope is that this aggressive intervention
will manage to re-start the process of investment and business creation, and
with it the recovery.
Following the Fed, all the main central banks have reduced their nominal
interest rates. The Bank of England, led by Mervin King, has been the ﬁrst
monetary authority to announce a policy of “quantitative easing”, that is to
buy long-term government bonds (for planned $ 75 billion) and, at the begin-
ning of March, it launched a reverse auction with investors as sellers, rather
than buyers, of U.K. “gilts” to the central bank. In mid March, also the Fed
announced it would buy long term U.S. Treasury bonds (starting with $ 300
billion). The European Central Bank, led by Jean-Claude Trichet, has reduced
the interest rates in a less aggressive way (see Fig. 6.7), and has not adopted
forms of unconventional monetary policy until now. In particular, the Euro-
pean monetary authority has not been engaged in outright purchases of private
securities or unsecured lending to the private sector42 or in purchases of public
debt, but has adopted a diﬀerent approach: it makes available unlimited credit
to banks at the oﬃcial rate (at 1.5 % at the time of writing) with short term
maturities (up to six months at the time of writing). This credit is provided
40See Greenspan (2007) for a fascinating account of his reaction to the stock market crashes
of 1987, 1998 and 2001.
41Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank
of New York Melllon and Wells Fargo.
42The rationale behind this has probably to do with the diﬀerent structure of the European
ﬁnancial system compared to the Anglosaxon one: European ﬁrms and households rely more
on banks than on capital markets, so it is better to lend freely to banks so as to help cap
lending rates rather than to lower the cost of capital in securities markets.
41against eligible euro-denominated collateral deﬁned in a very liberal way, so that
there is a large short-term liquidity in the Euroarea and the unsecured overnight
interbank rate is quite close to the American one. As a result, money supply
has been growing at substantially high rates, especially for the Dollar and the
Pound. Nevertheless, at the time of writing monetary policy appears to have
no traction at all on the real economy.
In front of the apparent resistance of the real economy to react to these
forms of monetary stimulus, two are the possible motivations. The simplest one
is that after all monetary policy is not as eﬀective as New-Keynesian theory
would claim, for instance because the reactions of the monetary authorities
are by now fully expected and already discounted, and therefore cannot be
eﬀective (Lucas, 1972; Sargent and Wallace, 1975): if this is the case and the
real economy follows its path in a way that is largely independent from monetary
actions, central banks should focus on controlling the inﬂation rate around a
favorite level, rather than taking the risk of creating undesired inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
medium run. The alternative hypothesis is that a suboptimal policy has been
implemented. According to many economists,43 during the last decade the Fed
set excessively low interest rates compared to the optimal Taylor rule, and did
not contrast the equity boom at the end of the 90s with a properly tight policy.
This would have been at the roots of the current crisis inducing excessive debt
and risk taking within the economy and generating the well known problems
of the ﬁnancial sector. Moreover, the low interest rates kept penalizing savings
and postponing a solution to the current account deﬁcit problem, which remains
a critical aspect of the American situation. On the top of this, the Fed is
now increasing money supply at a very high rate, which may create substantial
inﬂation and depreciation of the Dollar in the medium term (see Section 9), and
may also change the role of the central bank in harmful ways in the absence of
a quick recovery. According to John Taylor, “the success of monetary policy
during the great moderation period of long expansions and mild recessions was
not due to large discretionary interventions, but to following predictable policies
and guidelines that worked.”44
Contrary to the Fed, the European Central Bank has traditionally followed a
less aggressive management of the interest rates to stabilize the economy, paying
much more attention to the control of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eE u r oa r e a .E v e na tt h e
beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis, European rates remained above the American
rates for a while. Only during 2008, when residual inﬂationary pressures were
over, the European monetary authority has started reducing the interest rates to
contrast the recession, and a policy of quantitative easing has not been adopted
yet. This is not surprising for a more heterogenous area where opposite shocks
o f t e no c c u ri nd i ﬀerent member countries and where the monetary authority is
largely independent (and not even backed) from ﬁscal authorities. The European
43See Taylor (2009).
44Financial Times, “The Threat posed by Ballooning Federals Reserves”, March 24th, 2009,
p. 9.
42Central Bank may contemplate following the Fed and the Bank of England to
buy private securities or even government bonds (and it would be politically
hard to decide which member countries’ bonds to purchase), but only in case of
a further deterioration of the recession and concrete possibilities of deﬂation.
Many economists have claimed that the current recession undermines the
relevance of the neoclassical approach to macroeconomics and can only be ex-
plained within the (New-)Keynesian approach. However, we believe that the
real test of the Keynesian approach will emerge from the success or the failure
of the demand-based policies that are currently implemented to trigger the re-
c o v e r y ,b o t ho nt h eﬁscal and monetary front. As of now, the results are poor,
exactly as they have been during the “lost decade” of ineﬀective expansionary
ﬁscal and monetary policies in Japan. Time will give its verdict.
8 Trade Policy
The implications of the EMSs approach for trade policy are against many forms
of passive protectionism, including import tariﬀs and quotas, which are aimed
at restricting trade volumes. However, under certain conditions, they are in
favor of what could be called an active protectionism, based on strategic export
promotion, which may distort trade, but does not restrict trade volumes.
Our analysis of trade policy conﬁrms that positive import tariﬀsr e p r e s e n t
the optimal unilateral policy for the domestic market both in the traditional
case of an exogenous number of ﬁrms and in the case of an endogenous number
of ﬁrms competing in the domestic market. In both cases, the optimal tariﬀ
tends to zero under perfect competition, that is when the (exogenous or en-
dogenous) number of ﬁrms increases. In this sense, the qualitative predictions
of the neoclassical trade policy are not changed by the endogeneity of the mar-
ket structures. Neither are the standard critiques to these predictions: import
tariﬀs often lead to retaliation, and equilibria with multiple countries adopting
tariﬀs and quotas end up reducing the gains from trade. Passive protectionism
ultimately hurts global welfare.
In spite of this, under certain conditions, the EMSs approach supports active
forms of promotion of domestic ﬁrms in the international competition, as ex-
port promotion, export subsidies, R&D subsidies and protection of intellectual
property rights for the exporting ﬁrms. It is interesting to focus on this novel
aspect starting from the rationale for export subsidies.
What is the optimal trade policy with respect to exporting ﬁrms? How
much should we invest to promote international demand of domestic products?
There is a lot of debate about these questions between policymakers. This is
not surprising since also at a theoretical level there are not clear or unambigu-
ous answers. Common wisdom on the beneﬁts of export subsidization largely
departs from the implications of trade theory. While export promotion is of-
ten seen as welfare enhancing at least in the short run and often supported
43by governments, theory is hardly in favor of its direct or indirect implementa-
tion. In the standard neoclassical approach with perfect competition, the scope
of trade policy is to improve the terms of trade, that is the price of exports
relative to the price of imports, and, as long as a country is large enough to
aﬀect the terms of trade, it is optimal to tax exports (since this is equivalent
to set a tariﬀ on imports). In case of imperfect competition, a second aim of
strategic trade policy is to shift proﬁts toward the domestic ﬁrms. Therefore,
a large body of literature, started by Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton
and Grossman (1986), has studied international markets with a ﬁxed number
of ﬁrms to determine the optimal proﬁt-shifting policy. Also in this case the
optimal unilateral policy is an export tax under price competition, because the
tax induces the domestic ﬁrm to increase its price and relax competition, which
augments its proﬁts more than enough to compensate for the social cost of the
subsidy. Under quantity competition, an export subsidy could be optimal, but
only under restrictive conditions (on demand and on the number of domestic
ﬁrms).
Even if the World Trade Organization forbids export subsidies (except for
agriculture), diﬀerent forms of direct or indirect export promotion are wide-
spread. Governments strongly support exporting ﬁrms, they often hide forms of
export promotion behind nationalistic pride, and consider the conquer of larger
market shares abroad as a positive achievement in itself. The E.U. coordinates
trade between its members and the rest of the world in a similar spirit, and
subsidizes exports of agricultural products and the aircraft industry (Airbus is
probably one of the main examples of strategic trade policy). France supports
its “national champions” with public funding. Italy has a long tradition of pub-
lic support of the “Made in Italy”. Japan has adopted a policy of targeted
export promotion through its Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade. Korea
and other East-Asian countries have implemented export promoting policies for
decades. Heavily protected South-American countries have tried to subsidize
manufactured products in which they could develop a comparative advantage
(and not only those). Even U.S. has implemented strong forms of export sub-
sidization through tax exemptions for a fraction of export proﬁts, foreign tax
credit and export credit subsidies.
The EMSs approach provides a new theoretical argument for the general
optimality of export subsidies whenever the domestic ﬁrms compete in interna-
tional markets where entry is endogenous (notice that free entry is a realistic
assumption since a foreign country without a domestic ﬁrm in the market can
only gain from allowing entry of international ﬁrms). Under EMSs, export sub-
sidization becomes the best unilateral policy under quantity and price competi-
tion. The intuition is simple. While ﬁrms are playing some kind of competition
in the foreign market, the government can always give a strategic advantage to
its domestic ﬁrms with an appropriate policy. When entry is endogenous, an ex-
port tax would lead the domestic ﬁrms to increase their prices or to reduce their
production levels. On impact, this would induce the other ﬁrms to increase their
44prices or production levels respectively, so as to increase their proﬁts. However,
the increase of these proﬁts would attract entry ex ante until any extraproﬁts
were eliminated. As a result of this, the domestic ﬁrms would end up worse
oﬀ and the policy would fail. To the contrary, it is optimal to adopt a policy
that induces the domestic ﬁrms to be aggressive, that is to expand production
or (equivalently) reduce prices. This behavior limits entry of international com-
petitors and increases the market shares of the domestic ﬁrms. Such an outcome
can only be induced by subsidizing exports. Etro (2010) has derived the optimal
unilateral subsidy under diﬀerent market conditions. It turns out that the op-
timal subsidy is inversely related to the elasticity of foreign demand: ironically,
when goods are homogenous the optimal export subsidy is identical (but with
an opposite sign) to the optimal export tax emerging in the neoclassical trade
theory. In both cases, the distortions due to the policy increase with demand
elasticity, therefore high elasticity recommends lower intervention. However, the
neoclassical policy is aimed at increasing the price of exports, while the policy
recommended by the EMSs approach is aimed at decreasing the price of exports.
The general lesson about trade policy can be summarized as follows:
Principle 8. The optimal unilateral trade policy has to pro-
mote domestic firms competing with foreign ones through export
subsidies under any form of competition (with the optimal export
subsidy which is inversely proportional to the elasticity of foreign
demand).
8.1 Against passive protectionism, in favor of export sub-
sidies
As we have seen, the EMSs approach does not provide support for passive
protectionism in the form of import tariﬀs or other trade restrictions, but it is in
favor of export subsidies (and not generic state aid) because they do not restrict
trade volumes, but they actually tend to increase them. The same argument
can be applied to other forms of indirect export promotion, as policies which
boost demand or decrease transport costs for the exporting ﬁrms: as long as
these policies increase the marginal proﬁtability of the domestic ﬁrms, there is
a strategic incentive to use them unilaterally. Ultimately, the scope of export
policy is just to conquer market shares abroad and shift proﬁts from ﬁrms
of other countries towards domestic ﬁrms. If we interpret globalization as the
opening up of new markets to international competition we can restate the main
principle as follows: in a globalized world, there are strong strategic incentives
to conquer market shares abroad by promoting exports and adopting forms of
active protectionism. The positive aspect of the latter is that it does not restrict
t r a d e ,b u ti ta c t u a l l yp r o m o t e si t .
According to the World Trade Organization, the volume of world trade in
merchandising is expected to fall by 9 % during 2009, the largest decline since
45Figure 8: Euro-Dollar nominal exchange rate (January 2000-March 2009).
World War II. Meanwhile, passive protectionism is rising and the fear is that
it may aggravate the crisis, as it happened in the Great Depression, when the
American Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 increased U.S. import duties and provoked
widespread retaliation, which reduced global trade by a quarter. Notice that at
that time trade was less developed and was mainly inter-industry trade, while
today it represents a larger fraction of GDP and it is mainly intra-industry trade:
this leads to a deeper interdependence of economies and worse consequences of
import tariﬀs and other forms of passive protectionism. We believe that in a
period of crisis and globalization backlash as the current one there is an addi-
tional reason why certain forms of export promoting policies for high-tech and
diﬀerentiated products could be welcome.45 They would redirect the protec-
tionist tendencies away from the adoption of import tariﬀs and quotas, toward
a form of intervention (export subsidies) that can revitalize intra-industry trade
a n dh e l pt h er e c o v e r y .
The typical argument against foreign export subsidies is that subsidized
foreign ﬁrms exert unfair competition against unsubsidized domestic ﬁrms. This
sounds quite similar to the typical argument in favor of passive protectionism:
s i n c em o r ec o s t - e ﬃcient foreign ﬁrms exert unfair competition toward less cost-
eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms, we should adopt import tariﬀs. We believe that both
45Notice that the WTO allows export subsidies for agricultural goods, that are usually
homogeneous goods traded under perfect competition. We recommend the opposite policy:
forbid (or at least reduce gradually) export subsidies in inter-industry trade and allow those
in intra-industry trade.
46arguments are ﬂawed. In both cases, subsidized or more eﬃcient foreign ﬁrms
end up selling goods at lower prices with clear gains for the domestic consumers.
The only diﬀerence is that in the former case foreign governments are paying
for those gains, and in the latter case foreign workers are receiving lower wages
to provide those gains: ultimately the costs are abroad and the gains are at
home. Therefore, adopting import tariﬀs or forbidding export subsidies simply
reduces consumer welfare to protect domestic proﬁts. It is quite surprising that
many economists and the same World Trade Organization keep condemning
both import tariﬀs and export subsidies as if they were equivalent policies.
9 Exchange Rate Policy
In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, governments undertake occasional devaluations
with the speciﬁc aim of supporting the competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms in
international markets: for this reason we talk about competitive devaluations.
In a ﬂexible exchange rate regime this is not possible, but for the same reasons a
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, due for instance to an expansionary
monetary policy, is expected to support the competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms
exporting abroad.
In spite of this common wisdom, economic theory has been rather ambigu-
ous on the role of the nominal exchange rate. In the frictionless neoclassical
macroeconomic approach, exchange rate policy is neutral just like monetary
p o l i c y ,a n di tc a n n o ta ﬀect real variables. In the Keynesian approach, as long
as the devaluation improves the trade balance in the medium-long run, it boosts
aggregate demand with an expansionary eﬀect on the domestic country and pos-
sibly a negative eﬀect on the trading partners. The result is conﬁrmed within
the modern approach of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ, 1996), but not even under all circumstances (a devaluation could be even
welfare decreasing when the reduction in the purchasing power of the domestic
agents is strong enough). Finally, partial equilibrium models of competition
in international markets with ﬁrms engaged in pricing to market (Dornbusch,
1987) show that devaluations can start price wars between ﬁrms active in dif-
ferent countries, which ultimately leads to lower proﬁts for all of them. The
intuition for the last mechanism is simple: after a devaluation, exporters reduce
their prices in foreign currency thanks to the better exchange rate, but this
induces their rivals to do the same in order to defend their market shares and
proﬁtability, with the consequence that all the ﬁrms end up with reduced prices
and proﬁts.
In front of these contrasting theoretical positions it is diﬃcult to make
sense of the common wisdom according to which devaluations provide a positive
strategic advantage on the international markets with net beneﬁts for the de-
valuating country. However, the EMSs approach provides a consistent rationale
for this common wisdom by evaluating the strategic incentives to implement
47exchange rate devaluations in a scenario where the incidence of exchange rate
variations on prices is endogenous.
To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of exchange rate
variations on market structures, we need to brieﬂy review the role of exchange
rates in aﬀecting market competition. Imagine ﬁrst a market in a foreign coun-
try in which international ﬁrms produce and compete with independent produc-
tion units. This is typical of multinationals which are directly active in other
countries where they sell their products. Under price competition, this case of
local currency pricing with market power implies no pass-through of nominal
exchange rate variations on prices. In this situation, a devaluation is not going
to aﬀect the equilibrium in the foreign market. All ﬁrms would choose the same
prices in foreign currency after a devaluation, but the proﬁts of the domestic
ﬁrm would be artiﬁcially increased in the domestic currency. The same would
happen under quantity competition, since production decisions abroad would
be independent from the exchange rate again, but proﬁts in domestic currency
would be inﬂated by a devaluation. From a welfare point of view, the gains
in proﬁts from such a devaluation should be compared with the losses for the
society in terms of higher prices of the imports. More importantly, in this situ-
ation there is not a strategic incentive to implement a competitive devaluation:
this policy does not give a real strategic advantage to the domestic ﬁrm in the
foreign market but just artiﬁcially increases its proﬁts.
A totally diﬀerent situation occurs when all ﬁrms produce in their domestic
country, bear production costs in domestic currency, choose their strategy taking
into account the exchange rate and then export abroad (under price competition
this corresponds to the case of producer currency pricing). Such a case is typical
of SMEs which are active at a national level, often producing typical domestic
products and exporting some of them abroad, but also of larger ﬁrms which
are not directly active in the foreign market under consideration but sell their
goods to distributors of this market. In this situation competitive devaluations
are always desirable to provide a strategic advantage to domestic ﬁrms as long as
entry in the international market is endogenous. The reason is that devaluations
induce an aggressive behavior (lower prices or larger production) of the domestic
ﬁrm in the international market, and this is the only way to shift positive proﬁts
at home when entry in those markets is endogenous. The domestic ﬁrm ends up
with a larger market share and positive proﬁts compared to the unsubsidized
competitors. Finally, we need to remember that the competitive devaluation can
be eﬀective only in the short run, while inﬂation diﬀerentials tend to re-establish
the situation pre-devaluation in the long run.
In a world where exchange rates ﬂuctuate freely, our results need to be rein-
terpreted. In such a world, a depreciation of the domestic currency, due to any
international or monetary reason, has a strategic impact on the exporting ﬁrms.
Consider the likely case in which these ﬁrms export in foreign markets whose ac-
cess is open to any international ﬁrm. As a consequence of the depreciation, the
domestic ﬁrms are always led to reduce their prices in foreign currency, because
48t h ep r i c e se a r n e di nd o m e s t i cc u r r e n c yh a v eb e e na r t i ﬁcially increased and these
ﬁrms can always earn more proﬁts by reducing mark ups a bit to gain a larger
market share. Some international ﬁrms will try to follow this price cut and the
average mark ups in the industry will go down, with a consequent reduction in
the number of ﬁrms able to remain in the market. Nevertheless, the domestic
ﬁrms manage to earn larger proﬁts in domestic currency thanks to the increase
of their market shares.46 The same identical result follows if ﬁrms compete in
quantities: the domestic ﬁrms increase their production because the marginal
revenues in domestic currency are higher, they gain market shares and earn
more proﬁts. More generally, depreciations provide a strategic advantage to
the exporters under any market conditions as long as entry in the international
markets is endogenous, and they always increase exports and market shares of
the domestic ﬁrms in these markets. Of course, this has a positive eﬀect on
the trade balance and on the current account, at least in the short run, before
inﬂation diﬀerentials neutralize the impact of the depreciation.
We can summarize our results as follows:
P r i n c i p l e9 .I nt h es h o r tr u n ,ad e v a l u a t i o no rad e p r e c i a t i o no f
the exchange rate increases market shares and profits of the do-
mestic firms competing in international markets with endogenous
entry and increases always domestic welfare.
9.1 The depreciation of the Dollar
An immediate application of our discussion on exchange rates concerns the
eﬀects of the depreciation of the Dollar between 2002 and 2008 (see Fig. 8).
This started in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and
was strengthened by the expansionary monetary policy implemented ﬁrst by
Greenspan and later by Bernanke to contrast the downturn of the economy,
especially during the ﬁrst part of 2008, when the reduction of the U.S. interest
rates compared to the European rates (Fig. 7), and a general tendency of the
international central banks to diversify their monetary reserves contributed to
weaken the Dollar in favor of the Euro.
The initial consequence of the depreciation of the Dollar was that U.S. ﬁrms
could reduce their prices in foreign markets and gain market shares, sometimes
i n d u c i n gt h ee x i to fo t h e rﬁrms from those markets. Meanwhile, European ﬁrms
were forced to increase their prices in the U.S. and loose market shares, or to
maintain similar prices and reduce their eﬀective mark ups. In markets where
ﬁrms price to market, price diﬀerentials between the same goods sold in Europe
46The reader should keep in mind that in the absence of endogenous entry, the opposite
result occurs: a depreciation leads the domestic ﬁrms to reduce their prices, which induces a
price war in the foreign market. As long as entry is exogenous, the ultimate eﬀect is simply
to reduce proﬁts for all the ﬁrms. Therefore, a depreciation would hurt exporters.
49and the U.S. became substantial.47
At the aggregate level, the depreciation of the Dollar was slowly contributing
to promote U.S. exports and reduce the huge American current account deﬁcit,
from a high of 6% of GDP in 2005 to 3.3% in the third quarter of 2008. However,
the process of depreciation of the Dollar was inverted in the second half of 2008,
when the ECB started reducing the interest rates to face the crisis.
The current global scenario is characterized by a dichotomy between two
groups of countries. On one side U.S. and U.K. (with few other European coun-
tries including Spain) running current account deﬁcits that are driven by trade
balance deﬁcits an now also by huge public deﬁcits. On the other side, coun-
tries as Germany, China, Japan and other energy-exporting countries running
large surpluses, led by trade balance surpluses and now only partially reduced
by larger public deﬁcits (see Fig. 9). The ﬁrst group of countries has been
characterized by low (or negative) saving rates of the private sector that only
now are increasing, the second group by consistently high saving rates. This
dichotomy has worked ﬁne until recently, with net savers/exporters on one side
ﬁnancing net investors/importers on the other side, but such an unbalance may
create sustainability problems now. Especially if deﬁcit spending is stronger in
the group of countries running current account deﬁcits, as it appears to be the
case.
To have an idea of the substantial diﬀerence between these groups, notice
that in the last years U.S. household consumption was above 70 % of GDP,
while Chinese consumption was about 35 % of GDP. There are good reasons for
which the largest country (U.S.) can specialize in technological investments and
import ﬁnal goods from the rest of the world while running a current account
deﬁcit. However, this cannot go on forever, in particular while another country
(China) is growing at a much higher rate through excessive saving rates (prob-
ably beyond the border of dynamic ineﬃciency), and is expected to become the
largest economy in the near future.
In front of the current situation, we need further international policy coordi-
nation (possibly with a bigger role for a reorganized IMF) or even rethinking the
international monetary system. However, without substantial policy changes,
the main correcting factor could be the exchange rate. As of now, U.S. an U.K.
are implementing a massive monetary expansion, much stronger than in Europe.
While the recession is now depressing prices and in the short run prices are ex-
pected to be stable, in the medium run this policy may create heavy inﬂationary
47This is the case of luxury cars. In the summer of 2008, a new Porsche Carrera Convertible
sold in the U.S. at about 94,000 $, could be bought in Europe (where it is produced) at about
106,000 C =. At the exchange rate of 2002 the two prices would have been approximately
equivalent, but at the moment of maximal depreciation of the Dollar, the diﬀerential was
about 45,000 C =! The same happened for other cars sent from the other side of the Atlantic:
the price diﬀerential was 56,000 C = for an Aston Martin DB9 and 40,000 C = for a Maserati
Gran Turismo. European car makers could have increased their U.S. prices, but they would
have lost market shares: their best option was to sacriﬁce proﬁts temporarily and wait for the
depreciation of the Euro.
50pressures in both the U.S. and the U.K. This may lead to further depreciation
of the Dollar and the Pound, which in turn may ﬁnally increase U.S. exports
and reduce the global unbalance. In such a case, two scenarios are possible for
the medium and long term, and they are equally likely as of now.
In the ﬁrst (positive) scenario, we will arrive at inﬂationary pressures with an
ongoing recovery of the real economy and of the stock market, which will boost
both investment in business creation and consumption: this may be an easy
way out from the recession because interest rates and taxes could be gradually
increased to avoid excessive inﬂation and to keep public ﬁnances under control.
However, notice that we may end up in a quite diﬀerent world from the one we
are used to: without U.S. imports driving foreign growth, but possibly with a
pro-active role for Europe, which is now the largest integrated market in the
world, and, mainly, with a new role for the emerging China, and especially
for Chinese consumption and for Chinese investments in the Chinese economy
(rather than in the American one, as in the last decade).
In the second (negative) scenario, the stock market will fail to recover and
investments and consumption will remain weak while inﬂationary pressures
emerge, leaving the monetary and ﬁscal authorities with two options. The ﬁrst
one will be to ﬁght inﬂation back (and increase taxes to keep debt under con-
trol) so as to fall in another recessionary phase before recovering. The second
one will be to inﬂate the economy and reduce both private and public debt by
means of inﬂation. Also in this case, the growth model based on U.S. imports
from the rest of the world will have to change drastically.
However, there is a third scenario for the medium term, which is less likely,
but that we need to take into account. This is a scenario with an appreci-
ated Dollar and a recovering stock market, with an American demand-based
ﬁscal policy that artiﬁcially sustains a weak boom while increasing U.S. pub-
lic and foreign debt, and with European and Chinese economies unable to
drive global growth (respectively through innovations or expanding consump-
tion rates). However, it is unlikely that such an unstable scenario could last for
long.
10 Innovation and Competition Policy
The main message of the EMSs approach to the macroeconomy is that the
structures of the markets and their determinants (of technological, behavioral,
strategic and policy nature) are crucial for the evolution of the aggregate econ-
omy. For this reason industrial policy, including 1) innovation policy aﬀecting
competition for the markets and 2) antitrust policy aﬀecting competition in the
markets, must be taken in consideration when evaluating the general macroeco-
nomic policy. This becomes more important for markets whose eﬃciency has
a direct impact on other markets and whose technological progress is a main
driver of the entire economy, namely high-tech markets.
51Figure 9: World payment imbalances in Billions of U.S. $ (Average 2004-2007).
Source: Di Noia and Micossi (2009)
We have already encountered a number of results concerning industrial pol-
icy. It is now time to put them together and draw the implications for the
policies aimed at enhancing eﬃciency and growth in the global economy. The
basic principle emerging from the EMSs approach can be stated as follows:
Principle 10. The optimal industrial policy has to promote en-
try in the competition in and for the markets, subsidize R&D and
protect IPRs.
In the following subsections we will brieﬂy comment on innovation and com-
petition policy issues, topics on which we have extensively discussed in Etro
(2007,a, Ch. 5) and on which we return here.
10.1 Innovation policy and coordination
The general need to subsidize R&D and to protect IPRs departs from the am-
biguous results of the traditional theory of Schumpeterian growth and derives
from a result that we have emphasized repeatedly: in the presence of EMSs,
ﬁrms tend to invest too little in innovation and they tend to be engaged in
excessive duplication of their investments. This result is independent from the
aggregate size of the investment in innovation, which could be above or below
the eﬃcient level: in either case, the organization of R&D could be made more
eﬃcient concentrating it in larger ﬁrms that invest more in innovation. R&D
52subsidies and a stronger protection of the IPRs can achieve the same outcome,
but they do it in a diﬀerent way and they should both be used.
A second implication of the analysis of EMSs in the competition for the mar-
ket is that incumbent leaders tend to invest more than their rivals when they face
a strong entry pressure. This leads them to innovate more frequently, to persist
in their leadership position and to drive the growth process. Understanding the
nature of this phenomenon is crucial to implement the proper industrial policy
toward market leaders of dynamic sectors. Contrary to a populistic ideology,
the EMSs approach has shown that the protection of IPRs is fundamental to
promote sequential innovations, because it strengthens the incentives to invest
by both the incumbent leaders and the followers. Therefore, a policy discrimi-
nating against the IPRs of persistent leaders can have deleterious consequences
on the aggregate incentives to invest in R&D.48
R&D policy becomes even more important in a global perspective. When
ﬁrms compete for international markets, their investments generate global growth,
but each country tends to free ride in the implementation of the optimal R&D
policy. This happens because each country subsidizes unilaterally its domes-
tic ﬁrms with the purpose of shifting expected proﬁts toward home and not
with the purpose of promoting global growth. Alternatively, countries tend to
protect more the IPRs of the domestic ﬁrms than those of the foreign ones,
sometimes with a discriminatory use of antitrust policy. These tendencies lead
to suboptimal investments in new technologies at the global level.
International coordination for the protection of IPRs and the coordination
of ﬁscal policies to promote R&D are required to improve the allocation of re-
sources at the global level. While some countries have been trying to coordinate
the support of R&D activities at a supra-national level, heterogeneities in policy
views and lack of binding commitments have undermined these eﬀorts (in the
case of the European Union, think of the Lisbon Agenda or the attempts to
harmonize patent protection between the member states). Nevertheless, further
coordination for the protection of IPRs could enhance the global incentives to
invest in R&D in a substantial way. Additional delegation to an international
organization may be diﬃcult because there are still diﬀerent views on innovation
policy (with the U.S. much more in favor of the strengthening of IPRs protec-
tion than the E.U.). However, as in the case of other forms of coordination, it
would be eﬃcient to establish international standards for R&D promotion and
subsidization, probably at the level of the TRIP agreements, leaving individual
countries to do more.
48Nevertheless, a major economist as Stiglitz (2006) keeps being in favor of ﬁrm speciﬁc
policies, claiming that a solution to the “problem” of the persistence of the leadership of
Microsoft in the software market “might involve limiting Microsoft’s intellectual property
protection for its operating system to, say, three years. That would provide strong incentives
for it to provide innovations of the kind that users value and for which they would be willing
to pay. If it failed to innovate, others could innovate oﬀ its old operating system - it would
become a free platform, on top of which innovations in applications could be built”. It can
be extremely dangerous to neglect the aggregate consequences of this kind of policies.
5310.2 Competition policy in the U.S. and the E.U.
The promotion of competition in the market and the reduction of entry barriers
are crucial elements for the proper functioning of market economies and become
particularly important in a period of crisis, when tendencies to relax competition
and increase mark ups emerge naturally.
Antitrust policy plays a fundamental role in this sense, especially with its
action to deter collusive behavior aimed at increasing mark ups and to stop
mergers than can be detrimental to future competition.49 On this front both
the American and European antitrust authorities have adopted a similar and
wise approach, focusing on markets characterized by barriers to entry and not
on markets where endogenous entry forces can neutralize attempts to exercise
market power. It is important to notice that the borderline between price-ﬁxing
and merger cases that do and do not require intervention is not an absolute one,
but it depends on the macroeconomic conditions: in times of crisis, especially
when dealing with failing ﬁrms, antitrust intervention should be reduced.50
The main diﬀerences between U.S. and E.U. industrial policy emerge in the
general approach to market dominance and in the antitrust treatment of mo-
nopolization issues, which are extremely important not only for their impact
on the eﬀectiveness of competition, but also for their possible interference with
aggressive competition (which is often borderline with abusive practices) and
with innovation policy (which must protect some degree of market power to
guarantee the proper incentives). The diﬀerent approaches are well illustrated
by the report issued by the US Department of Justice in September 2008, “Com-
petition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act”, and the “Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Ap-
plying Article 82 to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct”, issued by the European
Commission three months later. These documents contain the general princi-
ples that guide the two authorities in deciding which cases to pursue and how
to deal with speciﬁc types of conducts.
The American approach emerging from the Report is aimed at the defense of
t h ec o m p e t i t i v ep r o c e s sb o t hi np r i n c i p l ea n di np r a c t i c e ,r e ﬂecting “a national
commitment to the use of free markets to allocate resources eﬃciently and to
spur the innovation that is the principal source of economic growth.” The analy-
sis of dominance pays a lot of attention on the limits imposed by endogenous
entry, emphasizing the role of entry pressure in disciplining market leaders in
spite of their large market shares. The Report provides an enlightening exam-
49European coordination involves an additional aspect which is quite important in a period
of crisis, the control of government intervention that limits competition in the European
markets.
50Nevertheless, the crisis has made clear that there is a particular market, the ﬁnancial mar-
ket, where deregulation has been excessive. This market requires new rules at the global level,
at least to coordinate general principles of micro-prudential regulation (concerning capital
requirements, management incentives, and information disclosure) and a proper supervision
of the international ﬁnancial markets.
54ple which is in perfect accordance with the implications of the EMSs approach:
“Suppose a large ﬁrm competes with a fringe of small rivals, all producing a
homogenous product. In this situation, the large ﬁrm’s market share is only
one determinant of its market power over price ... if the fringe ﬁrms can readily
and substantially increase production at their existing plants in response to a
small increase in the large ﬁrm’s price (that is if the fringe supply is highly
elastic), a decision by the large ﬁrm to restrict output may have no eﬀect on
market prices.”
More in general, the Report recognizes the poor correlation that can exist
between market share and market power, especially in high-tech sectors: “in
markets characterized by rapid technological change, for example, a high mar-
ket share of current sales or production may be consistent with the presence of
robust competition over time rather than a sign of monopoly power. In those
situations, any power a ﬁrm may have may be both temporary and essential
to the competitive process.” As a consequence the U.S. Department of Justice
adopts a non-intrusive role for antitrust policy in the competition in and for the
markets. For instance, predatory pricing can be established only when recoup-
ment is likely, that is only when entry is diﬃcult once the market is monopolized.
Moreover, the eﬃciency role of tying is recognized as a primary role (against
a long-lasting hostility), especially for technological tying, “an area where en-
forcement intervention poses a particular risk of harming consumers more than
it helps them in the long run. Technological tying often eﬃciently gives con-
sumers features they want and judicial control of product design risks chilling
innovation.” Finally, the Report marginalizes also the need for intervention in
case of a refusal to supply, because “forcing a competitor with monopoly power
to deal with rivals can undermine the incentives of either or both to innovate”
and because “judges and enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to set and su-
pervise the terms on which inputs, property rights, or resources are provided”.
In conclusion, the U.S. approach is based on the belief that competitive entry
forces are the main constraints on the exercise of market power and when they
are present antitrust intervention should be a marginal or residual necessity.51
The European approach is more interventionist.52 The cited Guidance of
the European Commission states the adoption of an “eﬀect-based” approach
that is aimed at maximizing consumer welfare and protecting an eﬀective com-
petitive process, and not simply competitors. There is an important new aspect
in the Guidance, the emphasis given to the role of entry in determining whether
a dominant position exists or not. The key element in the Guidance deﬁnition
51The Report largely reﬂects the Chicago approach to antitrust that was prevailing during
the Bush Administration. It is not entirely clear that the Obama Administration will adhere
fully to the approach laid down in the Report. However, for a related point by a moderate
leader of the so-called Harvard approach to antitrust, see Hovenkamp (2005).
52The rest of this section is based on the Opening Speech to the International Conference
on the Recent Developments on Antitrust Policy and the Enforcement of Art. 82, organized
by Intertic at the Autorit` a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Rome, March 6, 2009).
55of dominance is the extent to which the ﬁrm can behave independently of its
competitors, customers and consumers, which relates to the degree of competi-
tive constraints exerted on this ﬁrm by the supply of actual competitors, by the
threat of expansion of competitors and potential entrants and by the bargain-
ing power of customers. Therefore, entry plays a crucial role and dominance
should be incompatible with the presence of a threat of endogenous entry. In
particular, a leader “can be deterred from increasing prices if expansion or en-
try is likely, timely and suﬃcient”, but it would be also important to recognize
that the same entry can induce the leader to decrease its prices below those of
the rivals, or to adopt other aggressive strategies, without any anti-competitive
purpose, as the EMSs approach has made clear.
Beyond this, we have a strong concern on the way the positive premises
of the Guidance are carried through its details. The defense of consumers is
strongly emphasized in theory but not in practice: most of the focus of the
Guidance is on the foreclosure of competitors and not on the relation between
this and the harm to consumers, which is what should matter.
A related concern is about the nature of the foreclosure eﬀects under the
“eﬀects-based” approach. The Guidance indicates that a key element of abuse
is anti-competitive foreclosure, deﬁned as “a situation where eﬀective access of
actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or elimi-
nated as a result of the conduct of the dominant undertaking” which is likely
to proﬁtably increase its prices with harm for the consumers. However, it is
not entirely clear which facts are going to prove foreclosure and which not. For
instance, consider a situation in which new competitors enter in the market and
some competitors increase their market share to a signiﬁcant extent: one would
expect that this proves that the dominant company’s practice is not abusive,
but not even this can be taken for granted on the basis of the E.U. Guidance
(we provide an example below).
Another issue is about the standard of undistorted competition. As regards
pricing abuses, the European approach introduces the “as eﬃcient competitor”
test: “the Commission will normally intervene where the conduct concerned has
already been or is capable of hampering competition from competitors which
are considered to be as eﬃcient as the dominant undertaking”. However, the
document introduces several exceptions to this principle (for instance, a dynamic
view for which less eﬃcient competitors may become as eﬃcient in the future
through network or learning eﬀects), and the test does not apply to non-pricing
abuses. This means that companies are left without a clear standard.
As a last issue we welcome the conﬁrmation in the Guidance of an eﬃciency
defense: a dominant ﬁrm may justify a conduct leading to foreclosure on the
ground that eﬃciencies are suﬃcient to guarantee that consumers are not pe-
nalized. Now, while the consideration of eﬃciencies generated by a conduct is
extremely important to re-direct antitrust policy toward the maximization of
consumer welfare, in our view the Guidance appears to adopt a too vague ap-
proach and to make it hard, if not impossible, for dominant companies actually
56to avail themselves of the eﬃciency defense. The main reason is that their veri-
ﬁcation appears to be postponed after the establishment of an anti-competitive
foreclosure that harms consumers, and not during the decision on whether the
same foreclosure harms consumers. Moreover, there appears to be a bias against
the possibility that eﬃciencies can occur: for instance, technological tying is not
even mentioned as a source of eﬃciency in tying cases, but it is actually consid-
ered a source of greater risk of anticompetitive foreclosure (because more costly
to reverse).
Notice that, to assert a successful eﬃciency defense under the European
framework, dominant ﬁrms will be required to show that there are no other
less anticompetitive alternatives to achieve the claimed eﬃciencies. Does the
current rule mean that a defense must be rejected if the conduct creates more
eﬃciency gains than other conducts but is more restrictive on competitors? In
other words, is it the size of the eﬃciencies that matters or what matters is
the amount of restrictions imposed on competition to obtain those eﬃciencies?
Imagine the dominant company trying to manage these various imponderables:
it is much easier just to forego the conduct and, possibly, deprive consumers of
an important beneﬁt. Is that what competition policy is supposed to do?
Last, it is not clear why the possibility of an eﬃciency defense (and with it
the possibility to enhance consumer welfare) is to be oﬀ-limits for an entire class
of companies, as the Guidance makes clear when it states that an “exclusionary
conduct which maintains, creates or strengthens a market position approaching
that of a monopoly can normally not be justiﬁed on the grounds that it also
creates eﬃciency gains”. It is positive that the Commission eliminated the ref-
erence to ﬁrms with a market share above seventy-ﬁve per cent which appeared
in its 2005 document, but still, in our view, eﬃciencies should be assessed in
the same manner in all cases, regardless of the defendant’s market share.
Finally, the new guidelines do not seem to reduce the amount of uncer-
tainty that is associated with the move toward the rule of reason approach. For
instance, the potential conﬂicts between IPRs protection and antitrust policy
remain entirely unsolved: while the U.S. have taken a clear position against
the possibility of compulsory licensing of IPRs, the E.U. approach still contem-
plates this possibility under vague conditions. This kind of uncertainty can be
as o u r c eo fi n e ﬃciency and distorted behavior, especially when decision rules
are imperfect and subject to errors.53 More in general, antitrust uncertainty on
exclusionary strategies may deter genuinely competitive or innovative strategies
to be adopted by leading ﬁrms, and therefore it may exert negative consequences
on consumer welfare. Leading scholars of competition policy have noticed that
“the welfare cost of this lack of clarity and excessive caution must be enormous
to the E.U. economy as a whole - something the E.U. can ill-aﬀord given its
lack of competitiveness relative to other international blocks and the stated
53The lack of legal certainty is particularly regrettable in a context of increasing punitive
ﬁnes and important eﬀorts by the Commission to increase the scope for private enforcement
to complement public enforcement of E.U. competition law.
57objectives of the Lisbon Agenda in this regard.”54
In conclusion, the E.U. competition policy remains largely linked to a naive
version of the post-Chicago approach which is biased against market leaders
and in favor of their competitors in a way that is largely unrelated to the real
protection of consumers. The U.S. approach, closer to the principles of the
Chicago school, has proved to be much more useful in promoting competition,
business creation and innovation, especially in high-tech sectors.
10.3 Entry and competition in the browsers’ market
Elsewhere we have discussed a symptomatic example of the perverse E.U. ap-
proach to abuse of dominance issues, the Microsoft case on the tying of Windows
MediaPlayer to the Windows operating system and the refusal to supply interop-
erability information protected by IPRs.55 Since the Microsoft “saga” appears
set to continue with an ongoing preliminary investigation by the European Com-
mission on the bundling of the browser Internet Explorer (IE) with Windows,
we return to this important issue for the evolution of the New Economy.56
For twelve years, Microsoft has distributed its operating system with IE and
for eight of those twelve years, this has been done under a Consent Decree issued
by the U.S. antitrust authorities. Alternative browsers can be easily installed on
every PC and competition in the ﬁeld is on the basis of quality and functionality,
at least since the introduction of IE in the mid 90s led to a drop of the price to
zero. In the recent years Mozilla’s Firefox has seen considerable success, with
the gap between IE and Firefox’s respective market shares narrowing with every
passing month (see Fig. 10 for world market shares). Opera and Safari have
consolidated their market positions, while Google’s new Chrome quickly picked
up a few percent of the global market following its launch in autumn of 2008.
This tendency is even stronger in Europe, where the most recent data (from AT
Internet Institute) show a large drop of IE’s market share, from about 80 % a
few years ago to 66 % in January 2008 and 58 % in January 2009, while Firefox
has been growing up to 28 % in January 2008 and 33% in January 2009, Opera
reached respectively 3.2 % and 4.1 % and Safari 2.1 % and 3 % (with Chrome
at 1.5 % in January 2009). Notice that the access to the Internet is now a
fundamental component of any PC and it has promoted the rapid development
of all the Internet markets, starting with online sales and online advertising.
These kinds of markets represent the main engine of innovation, and in times of
crisis they contract as well, though they remain crucial drivers of the economic
recovery.
It is odd, to say the least, that the European Commission has decided at
54O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006, xi).
55See Etro (2007,a, Ch. 6). On September 17, 2007 the Court of First Instance concluded
the Appeal of the case and essentially upheld the 2004 Commission decision.
56This section is based on an article for the Italian newspaper Libero (“La Commissione UE
ci Riprova con Gates. A Che Pro?” by F. Etro, Libero Mercato, January 23, 2009, p.11).




































Figure 10: Market structure in the browser market (2004-2009). Source: our
calculations on Net Applications data
59this moment to pursue an investigation of Microsoft for abuse of dominance in
connection with the integration of IE into Windows.57 It is an issue already
raised and solved in the U.S. Clearly, the Commission is applying the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance in the earlier European case. In that
case, Microsoft was accused of excluding competition in the market for media
players and was forced to commercialize a new operating system without its
media player - which, by the way, was not bought by anybody, except for a
few hundred collectors. Today, the issue emerges with IE. As with media func-
tionality, a domain that has seen a ﬂourishing of competitors’ products such
as Apple’s iTunes, despite the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the market for
web browsers is marked by lively competition and a wide and easy diﬀusion
(rather than foreclosure) of rival products. The market can be read as ex-
tremely competitive, with a leader in a primary market (Microsoft for operative
systems)pressured by entry and innovation in a secondary market (browsers) to
adopt aggressive strategies. These include tying of the two products to be sold
at a very low price and heavy investments in R&D to preserve the leadership.
The consequence has been a strong competitive and innovative pressure from
other browser producers, with Firefox as the main alternative to IE, and im-
portant beneﬁts accruing to consumers in terms of price, quality and product
variety.
Moreover, there do not seem to be solid economic motivations in support of
the Commission’s thesis. It seems unlikely that Microsoft’s strategy can have
a predatory purpose because any increase in the price of IE is now unrealistic
(meaning recoupment is impossible). Moreover, Microsoft mostly gains from
the introduction and the diﬀusion of other browsers because this increases the
quality of PCs and therefore the demand for Windows, its main product. Many
users try diﬀerent browsers before choosing their favorite one, and it is hard
to imagine a more competitive scenario than this.58 Finally, there are clear
(technological) eﬃciencies from the design of an operating system including a
browser, which, as a matter of fact, can be substituted with another one in a
few seconds and freely. In conclusion, there are no reasons for which the tying
of Windows and IE could harm consumers, whose interest (not the interest of
the competitors) should drive antitrust policy.
If the Commission is going to pursue this direction, most likely it will ﬁne
Microsoft and force it to commercialize a new operating system without IE
(which, as it happened for the one without media player, will not be bought
by anybody) or with the option to install other browsers (saving few seconds
of free download). Apparently, such an outcome would not have any impact on
consumers, but the uncertainty on the freedom of innovation and eﬃcient prod-
uct integration could reduce the incentives to invest in R&D for Microsoft, for
all the software companies producing applications for Windows and IE, and for
57The original complaint was by the competitor Opera, later backed by Firefox and Google.
58Notice that the new version of Windows allows users to turn oﬀ applications such as Media
Player and IE, avoiding any limit to the exclusive use of competing applications.
60many other ﬁrms in similar situations, with harmful consequences for the future
consumers. Moreover, a “must-carry” remedy would strengthen the dominance
of Google as a search engine, since Mozilla and Opera are currently paid to pre-
set Google as the default search engine, and original equipment manufacturers
would be paid to do the same in the future, so as to limit competition in the
market for online advertising even more.59
These results are not what we expect from policymaking aimed at promoting
consumer welfare and growth, especially during a crisis that should suggest other
priorities for policymaking.
11 Conclusions
In this survey we have applied the main principles of the EMSs approach to
discuss three broad topics: the evolution of global markets of the New Econ-
omy and their endogenous structures (as for cloud computing, online adver-
tising or browsers), the evolution of macroeconomic phenomena (as business
creation, long run growth, globalization and innovation), and the prescriptions
for policymakers (on macroeconomic policy, trade policy, innovation policy and
competition policy).
With this mix of applications we want to make a key point: there is no way
to understand the macroeconomy that does not start from the structure of the
markets that belong to it, especially the high-tech and global markets whose
shocks, innovations and exchanges are at the basis of economic ﬂuctuations,
growth and trade.
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